Showing posts with label metaphysics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label metaphysics. Show all posts

Wednesday, 11 June 2014

Circumambulating the Alchemical Mysterium





‘One is the serpent whose poison is doubly composed’ — Cleopatra.
The following piece is adapted from the introductory chapter to my book, Alchemical Traditions: From Antiquity to the Avant-Garde (Numen Books, 2013). The book is a collaborative study of Eastern and Western alchemies, featuring emerging and leading scholars of the world’s alchemical traditions. The present article deals with alchemy from an etymological and historiographical perspective, and then looks more closely at the metaphysics underpinning alchemy as a nondual process.

Alchemy may be described, in the words of Baudelaire, as a process of ‘distilling the eternal from the transient’. [1] As the art of transmutation par excellence, the classical applications of alchemy have always been twofold: chrysopoeia and apotheosis (gold-making and god-making)—the perfection of metals and mortals. In seeking to turn ‘poison into wine’, alchemy, like tantra, engages material existence—often at its most dissolute or corruptible—in order to transform it into a vehicle of liberation. Like theurgy, it seeks not only personal liberation—the redemption of the soul from the cycles of generation and corruption—but also the liberation (or perfection) of nature herself through participation in the cosmic demiurgy. In its highest sense, therefore, alchemy conforms to what Lurianic kabbalists would call tikkun, the restoration of the world.
Almost invariably, the earliest alchemical texts describe procedures for creating elixirs of immortality—of extracting transformative essences from physical substances in order to render metals golden and mortals divine. Through this, the earliest alchemists innovated physical processes such as distillation and fermentation, extraction and refinement, and the analysis and synthesis of various chemical substances. However, it must not be forgotten that the earliest contexts of ‘material’ alchemy were not proto-scientific, but ritualistic. Whether one looks at the Taiqing (Great Clarity) tradition of third-to-sixth century China, the Siddha traditions of early medieval India, or the magical and theurgical milieux of Hellenistic Egypt, the most concrete alchemical practices were always inseparable from ritual invocations to and supplications of the divinities whose ranks the alchemist wished to enter. Moreover, in east and west alike, the alchemical techniques themselves were allegedly passed down from divinity to humanity. Alchemy was a divine art (hieratikē technē).
Whether stemming from the entheogenic properties of physical elixirs, or developing independently, the desire to encounter the divine directly through inner experience (gnōsis, jnāna) was soon cultivated via internal practices of a meditative or metaphysiological character. Here the elixir began to be generated within the vessels of the human body in order to transform it into an alchemical body of glory. Thus, the two basic traditions—external and internal alchemy; neidan and waidan, laboratory and oratory—can, in the final analysis, be regarded as complimentary approaches to the same end: the attainment of perfection through liberation from conditioned existence.
Despite these generalising remarks, and despite the unusual aptness of Baudelaire’s phrase, it must nevertheless be conceded that the effort to define alchemy to everyone’s satisfaction may well be impossible. On one hand, alchemy needs to be defined in a way that encapsulates the living breadth and depth of the world’s alchemical traditions. On the other hand, such a definition must also be internally consistent with the many specific, historically contingent (and at times contradictory) expressions of alchemy. Moreover, the very attempt to strike such a ‘golden mean’ between the universal and particular, between the ‘synchronic’ and the ‘diachronic’, is something of an alchemical act in and of itself—the elusive, indeed transformative, point where ‘art’ becomes science and ‘science’, art. In this respect, alchemy may well be seen to inhere precisely in such ‘nodal points of qualitative change’ (as Jack Lindsay called them in his landmark study of Graeco-Egyptian alchemy), [2] or in instances of ‘qualitative exaltation’ (as the twentieth-century alchemist, René Schwaller de Lubicz, described them with regards to the ‘teratological proliferations’ of biological species). [3]
Rather than offer a single, rigid definition (which will quickly become restrictive), what I would like to do in this introduction is present a series of linguistic, historiographical, and phenomenological ‘circumambulations’ around the alchemical mysterium. In so doing, I seek to trace some of the more salient contours of the alchemical landscape, and, if possible, glimpse the presence of its elusive ‘centre’. One of the merits of approaching alchemy by circumambulation is that it affords a much wider circumscription of the phenomenon than the narrowly fixed parameters of disciplinal specificity usually permit; it therefore allows a more eidetic or phenomenological insight to develop—an approach that, in German philosophical traditions, is seen to promote actual understanding (Verstehen) rather mere explanation (Erklären). [4] As Hans Thomas Hakl points out in a recent study of Julius Evola’s alchemical works, circumambulatio is precisely the approach taken in order to engender an actual experience of the realities that allegedly underpin the multiplicity of Hermetic symbols. [5] It is, potentially, a method of ‘knowledge by presence’ rather than simple ‘representational knowledge’. Of course, such approaches, which are fundamentally morphological in their method, are also ahistorical in character, and so what must be offered here is not an exclusively phenomenological approach, but a circumambulation that is also tempered in the fires of historical rigour. Such an approach, in my experience, is fundamentally more balanced than either of the extremes.
At the same time, it must be recognised that there is an inherent tension to this balance; a tension that requires one to embrace a Heraclitean ‘harmony of contraries’ between deeply opposed methodologies. In circumambulating a centre, whether as an ‘essentialist’ or ‘relativist’, the ultimate nature of the centre, indeed the substantial existence of the centre itself, must remain an open question. As the Dao de Jing remarks, ‘thirty spokes meet in the hub of the wheel, but the function of the wheel is in the empty part’. Without the concrete spokes of empirical-historical data, we may not become aware of the centre, and yet this centre, which is empty, is precisely the function (the phenomenological Verstehen) around which the spokes revolve, giving them their form, their function and thus their meaning. Both aspects are interdependent and both must be equally accounted for. Thus, before we open up to any deeper phenomenological perceptions, our circumambulations must begin by first situating alchemy in its concrete historical-linguistic and historiographic contexts.

Al-Kīmiyā
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Etymologies
The historical purview of what came to be called alchemy includes an undeniable current of influence stemming from Pharaonic and Hellenistic Egypt on one hand, and another stemming from ancient China, medieval India and Tibet on the other―currents that appear to have cross-fertilised before converging in Arabic alchemy, whence the term proper: al-kīmiyā. [6] Scholars have long known that the word alchemy points to an Arabic transmission (alkīmiyā becomes Spanish alquimia, Latin alchimia, French alchimie, German Alchemie, etc.) [7] The Arabic definite article al- points clearly to this, yet the precise origin of the lexeme kīmiyā is far from certain. Academic consensus has generally favoured Greek sources, notably those published by Marcellin Berthelot, [8] suggesting an origin from the term chyma (‘that which is poured out’; ‘flows, fluid’; ‘ingot, bar’; metaphorically, ‘confused mass, aggregate, crowd’; ‘materials, constituents’), whence chymeia, ‘the art of alloying metals’) named from its supposed inventor, Chymēs. [9] As Harris observes in his 1704 Lexicon Technicum:
Chymisty, is variously defined, but the design of this Art is to separate usefully the Purer Parts of any mix’d Body from the more Gross and Impure. It seems probably to be derived from the Greek word chymos, which signifies a Juice, or the purer Substance of a mix’d Body; though some will have it to come from cheein, to melt. It is also called the Spagyrick, Hermetick, and Pyrotechnick Art, as also by some Alchymy. [10]
The idea of fluid essences, extracts or elixirs is clearly central to the alchemical purview, and as will be seen throughout this volume, it is also inherent to the very names for alchemy in Chinese and Indo-Tibetan traditions (Chinese dao jindan, Sanskrit rasāyana, Tibetan bcud len). In addition, the Greek etymology distinctly emphasises the idea of metallic fusibility, and the idea that metals are fundamentally fusible entities proves central to the alchemical perception. The word ‘metal’ itself (metallon, metalleion) is homophonous with—and most likely derived from—a whole series of words indicating ‘transformation’, such as metalloiōsis, which is formed from the preposition meta– (‘between, with, after; taking a different position or state’) and the substantive alloiōsis (‘alteration’ or ‘change’). [11]
Whether derived from chyma, chymeia, Chymēs, or chymos, the term alchemy appears to come to the Latin west from late Greek sources through the same kinds of channels that preserved Platonic and Aristotelian texts, in Arabic translation, after the fall of the Greek Academy. While the lines of historical transmission are well known, matters are not quite as simple as they first appear. Egyptologists and Sinologists have both brought forward diverging evidence that the origins of alchemy lay not in Greece but in the Ancient Near or Far East.
The Egyptian Etymology
In addition to the Greek etymology, the root kīmiyā has also been traced to the Egyptian name for Egypt, km.t (Coptic keme, kēmi), which Plutarch gives as chēmia, ‘the blackest earth’ (malista melangeion). [12] The implications of this etymology are explored in detail elsewhere in this volume. [13] Suffice it to say for now that a wealth of theological and cosmological significations deeply pertinent to alchemy emerge from Plutarch’s identification of the name of Egypt with not only the blackness of the soil, but also with the blackness of the pupil of the eye. On a basic, symbolic level, this coheres with the fact that the Nilotic black earth, which literally (and geographically) defined Egypt, was fertile soil—the perfect receptor of life-giving seed; in the same way, the transparent openness that forms the pupil of the eye is the perfect receptor of light.
As will be seen, these significations directly tie the early conception of alchemy to genuine Egyptian theological conceptions on one hand, and to the Greek Hermetic corpus on the other, a point that has already been articulated in some detail by Erik Iversen with regard to the Memphite cosmology of the Shabaka stone and its clear recapitulation in the Corpus Hermeticum itself. [14] Furthermore, as the late Algis Uždavinys makes abundantly clear, this current of alchemy cannot be divorced from the numerous morphological continuities that exist between Egyptian mortuary cult on one hand, and Homeric, Orphic, Pythagorean, Platonic and hieratic Neoplatonic traditions on the other. [15] And as scholars such as Peter Kingsley have shown, these morphological connections are not merely apparent: they are deeply rooted in a fine web of mutual historical and geographical interactions between the initiatic traditions not only of Egypt itself, but those of southern Italy and Sicily (whence the Pythagorean current that would retain such a strong presence in the Hermetic tradition down through the centuries, from Bolus of Mendes to the Turba Philosophorum). [16]
The Chinese Origin of the Chem- Etymon
Joseph Needham, in the alchemical volumes of his magisterial Science and Civilisation in China, makes a very plausible case for the Greek and Arabic borrowing of the Chinese term jin (‘gold’) or jin i (‘gold juice, gold ferment’), terms explicitly linked to aurifaction, aurifiction and elixirs for perfecting bodies, all of which appears to place kīmiyā in an original context not only of Taoist metallurgical practices, but also of traditions of physical immortality (macrobiotics). [17] After one of the most lucid and thorough surveys of the existing etymological evidence for alchemy, Needham, concludes:
If some have found an influence of jin (kiem) on chēmeia (chimeia, chymeia) difficult to accept, there has been less desire to question its influence on al-kīmiyā. No Arabic etymologist ever produced a plausible derivation of the word from Semitic roots, and there is the further point that both jin i and kīmiyā could and did mean an actual substance or elixir as well as the art of making elixirs, while chēmeia does not seem to have been used as a concrete noun of that kind. We are left with the possibility that the name of the Chinese ‘gold art’, crystallised in the syllable jin (kiem), spread over the length and breadth of the Old World, evoking first the Greek terms for chemistry and then, indirectly or directly, the Arabic one. [18]
Needham makes it saliently clear that alchemy is not simply a product of Hellenistic culture. Although it is difficult to accept an exclusively Chinese origin for alchemy, the copious evidence adduced by Needham and his collaborators over four large volumes irrevocably transforms (and complicates) the overall picture of the genesis of alchemy. In short, not only must one come to terms with the Ancient Near Eastern influence upon Hellenistic and Islamicate alchemical traditions, one must also contend with the Ancient Far Eastern influences upon the intellectual and technical history of alchemy. This is especially pertinent given the attested lines of cultural exchange between the Asian, European and African landmasses along the Silk Road, which were established during the Han Dynasty (206 bce – 220 ce).
The most important Chinese term for alchemy was jindan, or ‘golden elixir’, which was conceived in both an external sense (as a macrobiogen) and an internal sense (as a spiritual embryo). [19] Jindan also referred especially to cinnabar, the red salt of sulphur and mercury, and the raw ingredient from which mercury was refined. As such, cinnabar points to one of the most ancient and pervasive mineral theophanies of the world’s alchemical traditions: the marriage of mineral sulphur and metallic mercury to form a red crystalline stone (mercuric sulphide). Around this naturally occurring substance, multiple layers of historical, cultural and mythological meaning would accrue not only in Chinese and Indo-Tibetan but also in Islamicate and European alchemical traditions.
With regard to our previous remarks on metal as a quintessentially fluid substance, it may also be added here that in ancient Chinese cosmology, metal (for which jin was also a generic term) was regarded as one of the five elements (wu xing); not only was it regarded as the ‘mother’ of the water element, the metal element itself was defined precisely by its double capacity to melt and to solidify into new form (as in a mould). [20] This ability to revert from a solid form to an amorphous or liquid state, and back again, is a very important principle. In the western alchemical canon it would inhere in the formula: solve et coagula, ‘dissolve and coagulate’, a formula that possesses deep symbolic value in regards to ontologies of ‘flux’ and ‘permanence’ (pointing to a more paradoxical ontology embracing both ‘permanence in flux’ and ‘flux in permanence’). It also underscores the universal value almost unanimously given to mercury as the ‘essence’ of metals. For next to gold and cinnabar, mercury figures as the most universal of all alchemical substances in eastern and western traditions alike. When alchemically refined, moreover, it came to be regarded less as a ‘substance’ per se, as more as the underlying principle of pure sublimity—of absolute volatilitywith the unique power to penetrate and transform all things, especially minerals and metals (the most dense things).
Historiographical Considerations
Due to the very nature of the topic, the study of alchemy has bordered on a surprisingly large number of disciplines. Generally, and significantly, it may be said to straddle both the history of science and the history of religions. Moreover, due to the wide, cross-cultural purview of alchemy, these dual histories have converged in Egyptological, Sinological, Classical, Islamic, Indo-Tibetan, medieval western, early modern and modern western contexts. [21] More recently, following the efforts of scholars such as Antoine Faivre, alchemy has become a topos in the history of western esotericism (i.e. the history of Hermeticism, gnosis, alchemy and related currents), which has become increasingly established as an academic discipline. [22]
As in other areas, scholars have started to speak less of ‘alchemy’ and more of ‘alchemies’, and an increasing effort has been made to distinguish and contextualise the individual currents or expressions of alchemy over and against the idea of alchemy as a sweeping, monolithic tradition. With this distinction comes the recognition that the idea of alchemy as a single, unified phenomenon is more the product of an esoteric interpretation of history (e.g. metahistory or hierohistory) rather than a strictly empirical description of historical phenomena. The idea of a Hermetic or alchemical ‘tradition’ thus says as much about the formulation of esoteric identity as it does about the complex historical and social vicissitudes of the phenomenon in question; [23] and yet, as Kingsley has noted, the idea of Hermeticism itself is bound precisely to a tradition of interpretation and translation (hermēneus) between traditions. [24] Moreover, as Faivre has noted, alchemy, like magic and astrology, evinces a strong cross-cultural character. With these considerations in mind, it is important to speak of alchemical traditions in the plural to emphasise the diversity and uniqueness of the different historical expressions of alchemy; this is not to preclude the possibility that broader unities may be discerned among them, but simply to ensure that they do not displace the individual care and attention that each current or tradition requires in order to be understood on its own terms. At the same time, grand, unifying perspectives, often unpopular in the post-modern academy, should not be abandoned, for they provide important heuristic tools that help elucidate and coordinate deeper thematic and morphological integrities.
Because a large part of the historiography of alchemy has typically been formulated within the context of the history of science, and because a virulent polemic against alchemy was pivotal to the establishment of a rationalised science, this has resulted in an overwhelmingly positivist and dualistic intellectual heritage in the study of alchemy. In the one-sided criticism advanced by positivist histories of science, alchemy is summarily dismissed as merely erroneous proto-chemistry. Fortunately, much of the effort in the historiography of alchemy over the past fifty years has been successful in slowly dismantling this lingering attitude so that more balanced perspectives have been able to prevail. [25]
Misconceptions in the historiography of alchemy from the perspective of science are, of course, matched by those advanced from the perspective of religion and spirituality. With the turn of the scientific revolution towards the end of the seventeenth century, alchemy and chemistry, previously synonymous under the term chymistry, were vociferously differentiated and, although the esoteric rhetoric of alchemy continued, its operative aspect was largely (though by no means entirely) abandoned. [26] By the Victorian era, this current culminated in the works of Mary Anne Atwood and the affirmation of an exclusively spiritual alchemy in which the operative element would be dismissed entirely. [27] ‘There is no evidence’, remarks Principe, ‘that a majority, or even a significant fraction of pre-18th century European alchemical writers and practitioners saw their work as anything other than natural philosophical in character, as even the prolific occult writer, A. E. Waite (1857–1942) was forced to admit toward the end of his career in 1926’. [28] Such remarks are useful for establishing broad lines of development, and while on the large accurate, must also be taken with a grain of salt, especially in light of statements by pre-eighteenth century alchemists such as Stephanos of Alexandria (seventh century), who explicitly emphasises intellectual and theological aims, most notably in his admonition: ‘Put away the material theory so that you may be deemed worthy to see with your intellectual eyes the hidden mystery’. [29] (This counter-example is important, for Stephanos’ work is explicitly linked to the Byzantine and Arabic traditions that form the foundations of European alchemy).
Despite such nuances, many scholars remain increasingly critical of not only the spiritual interpretations of alchemy popular in the nineteenth century, but also the psychological interpretations of alchemy that emerged in the twentieth. The scholarly discontent with these interpretations appears to derive from the fact that they strongly colour many people’s assumptions about alchemy. These scholars therefore see themselves as undertaking the ‘continuous dismantling of erroneous views of alchemy promulgated since the Enlightenment which have, despite their dubious qualifications and origins, deeply tinctured a major part of the literature on alchemy written during the 19th and 20th centuries’. [30] Such attitudes are particularly directed against the very influential work of Carl Jung, for whom processes in the alchemical vessel are a screen for the archetypal projections of the psyche. [31] Not surprisingly, Jung has come under increasing historical criticism in this regard; Lawrence M. Principe, for instance, has suggested that the work of Jung is merely an extension of the ‘deleterious outgrowth’ of Victorian occultism. [32] Principe, whose own area of specialty is early modern European alchemy, is particularly critical of the occult-spiritual and psychological interpretations as he finds them in especial contrast to his findings in the works of early modern chymists, such as Starkey, Philalethes, Boyle, and Newton, among others.
While the excesses of the spiritualist and psychological interpretations are recognisable when circumscribed to their proper contexts, this by no means precludes more nuanced approaches to the question of psychological and spiritual alchemies. In this respect, in the early modern period alone, some of Principe and Newman’s own oversimplifications have been countered by the more nuanced studies of the spiritual dimension in early modern alchemy proffered by scholars such as Hereward Tilton, who observes: ‘The historiography proposed by Principe and Newman can only be upheld by portraying early modern laboratory alchemy as purely ‘chemical’ research (conceived in crypto-positivist terms), and by erasing from history the development of alchemical thought subsequent to the seventeenth century. For researchers in the history of western esotericism, this modus operandi is entirely inadequate’. [33] Indeed, too rigid an insistence on an overtly or exclusively operative alchemy cannot be sustained nor extended beyond its proper contexts, any more than can an exclusively spiritual alchemy; this becomes especially evident once one steps outside the relatively narrow period of early modern and modern western Europe, whereupon the picture changes drastically. The broader picture offered by the history of religions opens up a far deeper perspective on the relationship between operative and spiritual alchemies. David Gordon White’s magisterial study of rasāyana siddha traditions in Medieval India, for instance, lays bare a blatantly alchemical world in which the transmutation of the mortal human body into an immortal, divine body was explicitly homologised with metallurgical transmutations according to the formula: ‘as in metals, so in the body’. [34] Here, the whole elixir tradition takes centre stage, the origins of which take us back to the deeply Taoist alchemy of ancient China, which, per the work of Needham, Sivin and Pregadio, shows no contradiction at all between the inner (neidan) and outer (waidan) elixirs. [35] The case becomes even more explicit in the Tibetan Buddhist alchemy of the Kalacakra Tantra, in which metallurgical, medicinal, and metaphysical aims are thoroughly intertwined; here, metallurgical and botanical processes are used in the creation of iatrochemical elixirs designed to prolong life not for its own sake, but in order to ‘buy time’ to achieve liberation in life (jivanmukti) through the actualisation of the initiate’s Buddha Nature (buddha-dhātu, tathāgatagarbha). [36] Elsewhere, the work of Henry Corbin on the Persian alchemist Jaldakī shows the deep insistence that was placed in Islamicate tradition on alchemy as an ars hieratica, and the distinct relationship that was seen to exist between the metallurgical process, the animation of statues, and the creation of a resurrection body. [37]
The deep relationship that emerges here between metallurgical and physiological processes all pertain strongly to the hidden continuity between all bodies, from the mineral to the divine. Therefore, inasmuch as general statements about alchemy are to be advanced cautiously, if at all, the fact that alchemy has traditionally been studied from the twin vantages of the history of science and the history of religions appears to reflect a strong tendency in alchemy toward the unification of the material and the spiritual.

Alchemy as Nondual Process

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A child of metallurgy and the traditional crafts, alchemy cannot be easily separated from the concrete aspect of existence any more than it can be separated from the transcendent. Indeed, both become interfusible, interdependent and interchangeable. If alchemy appears elusive, it is precisely because it cuts across categories ordinarily seen as mutually exclusive. For this reason, alchemy may be better approached not so much as a fixed domain of activity, but as a nondual process. Indeed, its sphere of operation is better comprehended as existing between domains, or better yet, as the medium in which more ‘fixed’ domains proceed. Like the fusible nature of metals, this medium may be regarded as the ‘substance’ from which fixed forms ‘solidify’, and into which they ‘dissolve’. As such, it is the conditio sine qua non for transmutation and dissolution, for converting one form into another, and for dissolving and abrogating the familiar boundaries or borders between apparently fixed states.
One explicit example of this is the fact that the key object of the western alchemical quest itself—the philosopher’s stone or ‘universal medicine’ (the perfecting agent par excellence) is also, literally, a universal poison. In the Greek alchemical manuscripts, the expression is given as katholikon pharmakon. The word katholikon means ‘universal, whole’, while pharmakon, a very ambiguous word, means not only ‘medicine’, but also ‘poison’, and ‘magical philtre’. According to the mercurial Jacques Derrida (who perhaps understood ambivalence better than anyone):
this ‘medicine’, this philter, which acts as both remedy and poison, already introduces itself into the body of the discourse with all its ambivalence. This charm, this spellbinding virtue, this power of fascination, can be—alternately or simultaneously—beneficent or maleficent’.[38]
‘If the pharmakon is ambivalent’ continues Derrida, ‘it is because it constitutes the medium in which opposites are opposed, the movement and the play that links them among themselves, reverses them or makes one side cross over into the other (soul/body, good/evil, inside/outside, memory/forgetfulness, speech/writing, etc.)’ [39] Thus, in conjunction with its ability for transformation, the (universal) pharmakon is also a medium for cosmic enantiodromia.
This capacity for fluid interweaving between different states of existence is perhaps most eloquently expressed within alchemical tradition proper by the seventeenth century Sufi, Muhzin Fayz Kāshānī, who described a process in which ‘spirits are corporealised and bodies spiritualised’, a process that, according to Henry Corbin, takes place in an ontologically real, yet liminal, zone—the mundus imaginalis—which Corbin defined precisely as a juncture between the eternal and the transient, the intelligible and the sensible: the intermonde or intermediary realm par excellence.[40] Importantly, Corbin’s phraseology is not only drawn from Persian and Arabic mystical texts (which deeply tinctured the alchemy of the time), it is also consonant with other, earlier Islamicate alchemical sources, such as the Kitab Sirr al-Asrar (Latin: Secretum Secretorum), whose Tabula Smaragdina (Emerald Tablet) famously states: ‘that which is above is like that which is below, and that which is below is like that which is above, to perform the miracles of the one thing’. [41] This formula, which is further ascribed to [pseudo] Apollonius of Tyana’s Book of the Secret of Creation, or Book of Causes (Kitāb Sirr al-ḫalīqa, or Kitāb al-῾ilal), bears a still deeper identity to the hieratic art as practiced by the Neoplatonic theurgists. According to Proclus,
the theurguists established their sacred knowledge after observing that all things were in all things from the sympathy that exists between all phenomena and between them and their invisible causes, and being amazed by that they saw the lowest things in the highest and the highest in the lowest.[42]
In the alchemical purview, the ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ aspects of existence are ultimately reciprocal and interdependent expressions of a deeper, more inclusive reality. Thus, to separate alchemy into a purely material and a purely spiritual aspect in a mutually exclusive fashion, without recognising their fundamental complementarity, is to miss the greater flux between the volatile and the fixed with which alchemy is almost invariably concerned. As a hieratic art, the alchemical vision of reality encompasses all levels of existence within the holarchical monad, and as such engages the world—including the world of duality, which is subsumed in the greater whole—as a nondual reality: a simultaneously abstract and concrete integrum.
In speaking of alchemy as a nondual process it is important to understand just what is meant when the term ‘nondual’ is used. The word itself is a formal translation of the Sanskrit word advaita (a- + dvaita, ‘not dual’), [43] and is used to indicate an epistemology in which both ‘seer’ and ‘seen’ are experienced not as separate entities but as a unity, a single act of being in which both the subject and object of experience become agent and patient of one divine act. While nondualism forms the basis of three of the broadest currents in eastern metaphysics (Buddhism, Taoism and Vedānta), it is also expressed explicitly or implicitly in the western philosophical canon by figures such as Plotinus, Eckhart, Böhme, Blake, Spinoza, Schelling, Hegel, Nietzsche, Bergson, Whitehead and Bohm, to name but a few. Despite this, the idea of nondualism has not been readily understood or accepted in the west, and this is because western constructions of reality, especially after Decartes and Kant, are based precisely upon a strict affirmation of mind-matter or subject-object dualism. At the root of the matter lie two fundamentally different ways of experiencing the world. One is the ‘everyday’ experience available to everyone; the other proceeds from a metaphysical experience theoretically available to, but not necessarily attained by, everyone. Although dualism and nondualism describe two different experiences of the world, it is not simply a recapitulation of the materialist-idealist divide (which is simply another dualism). As David Loy remarks:
none of these three [Buddhism, Taoism, Vedānta] denies the dualistic ‘relative’ world that we are familiar with and presuppose as ‘common sense’: the world as a collection of discrete objects, interacting causally in space and time. Their claim is rather than there is another, nondual way of experiencing the world, and that this other mode of experience is actually more veridical and superior to the dualistic mode we usually take for granted. The difference between such nondualistic approaches and the contemporary Western one (which, given its global influence, can hardly be labelled Western any more) is that the latter has constructed its metaphysics on the basis of dualistic experience only, whereas the former acknowledges the deep significance of nondual experience by constructing its metaphysical categories according to what it reveals. [44]
What is proposed, therefore, is to begin to understand certain forms of alchemy as an expression of a nondual experience of (and engagement with) the world, not only with regard to the dualities of spirit and matter, but also their corollaries: subjective experience and objective experiment. As Prussian poet and Kulturphilosoph Jean Gebser observes with regard to the structures of consciousness that underpin entire modalities of civilisation, nondualistic or aperspectival epistemologies do not exclude but integrate more perspectivally-bound epistemologies within a diaphanous whole. [45] What this means is that apparent dualities are not ultimate; rather, they are relative expressions of a deeper reality that is ultimately free from the limitations of dualism and opposition. It means that one can see all things in the ‘ultimate’ reality, and reciprocally, the ‘ultimate’ reality in all things. It is to see, with Blake, ‘a World in a Grain of Sand’ and ‘Eternity in an hour’. [46] According to this view, one eventually fails to distinguish between the ultimate and the relative in a rigidly dualistic way, abandoning the attribution of any inherent ontological primacy to one or the other. Because there is no longer any essential contradiction or opposition perceived to exist between them, so-called ‘material’ and ‘spiritual’ realities become co-present, interdependent expressions of a deeper, ‘existentiating’ field of being. [47] What is more, according to the ancient epistemology ‘like knows like’, the nondual, aperspectival or integral nature of reality, in both its relative and ultimate expressions, can only be known by the nondual, aperspectival or integral consciousness. It is in this sense that alchemy, in its more profound sense, necessitates a metaphysics of perception.
Agent and Patient of One Divine Act
To illustrate the dynamics of this process and to conclude our circumambulations, let us have a look at a series of interrelated alchemical formulæ from Persian and Graeco-Egyptian antiquity—a series of formulas that not only persist in various permutations throughout the Graeco-Egyptian, Islamicate and European alchemical corpora, but which are also mirrored in the alchemical symbolism of the far east. As will be seen, these formulas all revolve around the image of the ouroboros: the beginningless serpent that swallows its own tail.
The image of the ouroboros itself can be traced as far back as the Egyptian mehen serpent (circa 1500 BCE). The complex historical origins of the ouroboric formulas, however (which are replete throughout the Graeco-Egyptian alchemical canon), are linked to a mysterious Persian magos named Ostanes, who allegedly passed the knowledge of his science on to the Greek philosopher, Democritus. [48] The tradition linking Ostanes to Democritus was transmitted, some say invented, by the Hellenistic alchemist Bolus of Mendes (c. 200 BCE), who tells us that Ostanes was summoned from Hades in a rite of necromancy to divulge the secrets of his alchemical science. According to the text, Physika kai mystika, Ostanes directed his necromantic inquirer to the temple, where Democritus reportedly found the lost texts inside a pillar (stēlē). [49] Intimating the explicitly self-reflexive nature of the alchemical process, the science of Ostanes preserved in these texts was distilled in the following formula:
nature delights in nature; nature overcomes nature; nature rules nature.
hē physis tē physei terpetai, hē physis tēs physin nika, hē physis tēn physin kratei. [50]
In support of this tradition, Synesius informs us that Democritus was ‘initiated into the mysteries by the great Ostanes in the temple of Memphis along with all the priests of Egypt’, while the Greek chronicler George Syncellus not only corroborates the presence of Ostanes in Egypt, but informs us that he was sent there to preside over the Egyptian priests. [51] The motif appears to be further corroborated by the correspondence preserved in a water-damaged Syriac manuscript between a Persian magos called ‘Ostron’ (probably from āsrōn, ‘priest’) and an Egyptian philosopher by the name of Pebechius. [52] Pebechius announces to Ostron that he has discovered the books of Ostanes, written in Persian, in Egypt, and he asks for Ostron’s assistance in translating them. The texts contain distinct alchemical references, including a series of inscriptions on ‘seven sacred stelæ [or tablets] of Hermes’ (foreshadowing the famous tabula smaragdina of Hermes Trismegistus), which are hidden behind seven portals, each associated with the seven planetary metals. After a lacuna in the manuscript, mention is made of a ‘dragon that eats its tail’, alongside ‘other works of art of a symbolic character’. [53]
According to the formula of Ostanes, nature enjoys, conquers and rules herself like an ouroboric serpent. In order to understand what this formula means, we must comprehend its double character. This is most evocatively signalled in the quote from Cleopatra’s Chrysopoeia that we placed at the beginning of this chapter: ‘One is the serpent, which has its poison according to two compositions’. Cleopatra’s formula comes from a fascinating illustrated Greek manuscript depicting the dual-natured, self-returning serpent. Here, two inscriptions nested in concentric circles form a stylised ouroboros. The outer coil reads: ‘One [is] the all (hēn to pan), the source of all, and the culmination of all; if the all did not contain the all, it would be nothing’. The inner coil reads: ‘One is the serpent (ophis), which has its poison (ion) according to two compositions (synthēmata)’. [54] At the centre of the circle are the Hellenistic symbols for sun, moon and mercury.
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Stylised ouroboros from pseudo-Cleopatra’s Chrysopoeia (Aurifaction, or Gold-making). The outer coil reads: ‘One [is] the all, the source of all, and the culmination of all; if the all did not contain the all, it would be nothing’. The inner coil reads: ‘One is the serpent, which has its poison according to two compositions’. Left-to-right, the symbols at the centre are the Hellenistic signs for moon, mercury and sun.
The line is an elaboration of the root formula, hēn to pan, ‘one [is] the all’, expressing the self-contained, self-reflexive, thus ‘Hermetically sealed’ character of the alchemical process. Perhaps the most revealing key to this formula is provided by the Egyptian alchemist, Zosimos of Panopolis—one of the earliest and most important figures of the western alchemical canon. In a text entitled ‘On the Divine/Sulphurous Water’ (Peri tou theiou hydatos), Zosimos prefaces a version of the ancient Democritian formula by saying that the divine water possesses ‘two natures’ but ‘one essence’ (dyo physeis, mia ousia): ‘It is the all, and from it the all [comes], and by it all [exists]’.[55]
The theme of two alchemical natures as complimentary expressions of one underlying pan-unity would dominate alchemical symbolism right down to the early modern period. According to the overarching schematic of the alchemical perception, reality unfolds from a single essence that polarises itself into two natures: one that separates, and one that unites. The struggle and interplay of these two natures embody the twin processes active in the constitution of reality. Thus conceived, reality as such evolves from one primordial nature or ‘substance’, which polarises itself, acts upon itself, and reacts to its own activity to create the multiplicity of phenomena in which we are situated. Reality, according to this ouroboric perception, consists of one nature acting upon itself, dividing itself, multiplying itself, and finally returning to itself.
In the eastern alchemies, this same ‘double natured single essence’ is expressed in the simultaneous bi-unity and bi-polarity of masculine and feminine principles (Chinese yang-yin, Sanskrit shiva-shakti, Tibetan yab-yum, etc.), where the two gendered polarities represent the complementary aspects of an active-passive, mutually interpenetrating and inter-receiving integrum. [56] Dual natures were thus seen to inform the dynamic of a unitary reality, a conception readily seen in the Taoist taijitu (‘chart of the supreme ultimate’) through the harmonious interplay of dark and light (yin-yang). In accordance with this symbolism, images of ancient Chinese tail-eating dragons are attested as early as the Zhou dynasty (ninth to sixth centuries, BCE). [57] They signify the processes of duality and multiplicity emerging from and returning to its primordial unicity (the dao) through the separation and unification of opposites.
One notable example, dated to the Shang-Zhou dynasty (c. 1150-950 BCE) and preserved in London’s Victoria and Albert Museum, is fashioned from jade and coloured with cinnabar. The minerals are alchemically significant. Jade represents the principle of celestial immortality, while cinnabar (sulphur and mercury, components of the elixir) represent the two natures or polarities (yang-yin) that emerge from the primordial ground of being, and which must be refined and united in order to realise celestial immortality. The ouroboric form itself, moreover, is best understood as an augmentation of the exceedingly ancient bi discs (flat discs of jade with a hole in the centre). Dating back to Neolithic times, the bi discs possess a cosmological significance that remained influential down to the Warring States and Han periods. Specifically, they represent the idea of a heavenly covering (gaitian) revolving upon a central axis. [58] The Chinese ouroboros is thus assimilated to the primordial, eternally circumambulating celestial unity, and like its Hellenistic counterpart, is imbued with two ‘poisons’ or natures.
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Jade ouroboric dragon coloured with cinnabar. Shang-Zhou Dynasty, c. 1150-950 BCE. Victoria and Albert Museum, London.
Just as polarity emerges from the primordial ouroboric eternity, so too is it swallowed up by this eternity. The two alchemical phases, the cosmogonic emergence and its reabsorption, thus form two arcs of one cycle. Taoist alchemy proceeds precisely by the reversal of the cosmogony. [59] The return from multiplicity to the primordial Tao thus constitutes the alchemical path. [60]
These two arcs or orientations—one creative and the other de-creativeare pivotal for comprehending the seemingly opposing aims of alchemy across traditions. In some currents of alchemy, the art is explicitly connected with participation in the divine demiurgy and thus the catalysis of the cosmogonic process, [61] whereas in other currents of alchemy it is precisely the reversal of the cosmogony and the reabsorption of creation into the primordial, pre-creative substratum that is sought. It is why practicing, laboratory alchemists begin with reincrudation (the reversion of a metal to its primordial, living state); it is what Sufi alchemists call ta’wil (the process of ‘interpretation’ by which a phenomenon is taken back to its creative source); and what Taoists alchemists call reversal (ni) or inversion (huan) of the normal order by which things come into existence (i.e. the reversal of the dao or ‘way’ by which the cosmogonic process instantiates itself). The two orientations go a long way to explaining the respective material and mystical emphases of alchemy, and when both arcs are understood as interrelated phases within a greater ouroboric cycle, the antinomy between the two can be resolved. The snake must destroy itself to create itself.
Through a fluid process of constant creation and dissolution towards an ever-present, primordial perfection, one encounters a series of polarities that, when engaged, transmuted and refined, lead back to the principle from which they originated. Like the fertile black earth, and like the god Osiris, the ouroboros represents the principle of regenerative death underpinning embodied existence. At the same time, however, it is also the principle of celestial deathlessness that transcends all earthly generation and corruption. While on one level, the divergent approaches may be understood as two phases within a single cycle, on another level they are actively and simultaneously conflicting. Indeed, it is precisely the tension between them that is of interest, for it forms a ‘harmony of contraries’ in which opposition is actually integral to the greater constitution. Indeed, more than anything else, it is the Heraclitean principle of ‘counterstretched harmony’ (palintonos harmoniē), that provides the most convincing Ariadne’s thread out of the alchemical labyrinth.
The Hermetically sealed, ‘henadic’ ontology is both agent and patient of its own transmutation, which is effected precisely through the act of dismemberment (separation) and reunification (reintegration) according to what Zosimos calls ‘the rigour of harmony’ (systasin harmonias). [62] Here, alchemical processes are not ‘operations with natures alien one from the other’; they are ‘one thing’, that is to say, ‘one nature, acting upon itself’: [63]
One nature transforms itself. For all things are woven together and all things are taken apart and all things are mingled and all things combined and all things mixed and all things separated and all things are moistened and all things are dried and all things bud and all things blossom in the altar shaped like a bowl. For each, by method and by weight of the four elements, the interlacing and separation of the whole is accomplished for no bond can be made without method. The method is natural, breathing in and breathing out, keeping the orders of the method, increasing and decreasing. And all things by division and union come together in a harmony, the method not being neglected, the Nature is transformed. For the Nature, turning on itself, is changed. And the Nature is both the nature of the virtue and the bond of the world. [64]
These ‘rigours of harmony’—in which all things are ‘mixed’ and ‘separated’, ‘woven together’ and ‘taken apart’, and which ‘by division and union come together in a harmony’—pertain to the most quintessential methods in the alchemical path to perfection. Generally speaking, transmutation towards perfection proceeds by means of separation (purification) and unification (reintegration), or in Empedoclean terms, ‘Love’ and ‘Strife’. This is as true of eastern as well as western alchemies, both of which proceed by separating and purifying the primordial polarities (the two poisons or natures, whether sun-moon, sulphur-mercury, yang-yin, and their many symbolic homologues) before recombining them in their purified forms (the cohabation or ‘chymical wedding’ in European alchemy; the formation of the ‘golden embryo’ in Taoist alchemy; the ‘union of wisdom and method’ in Tibetan alchemy, etc.) However in doing this, it is imperative to realise that alchemy is not creating something ‘new’; rather, it is ultimately seeking to render the pristine ontology—the nondual ground of being—present to living perception. This underscores a significant point, for in understanding the goal of alchemy as ‘perfection’, it must be realised that the perfection in question is not teleological, but perennial. That is to say, the originary or primordial nature does not exist in the future, nor should it be confused with the past; it is, in the words of Gebser, ever-present and ever-originating:
Origin is ever-present. It is not a beginning, since all beginning is linked with time. And the present is not just the ‘now’, today, the moment or a unit of time. It is ever-originating, an achievement of full integration and continuous renewal. Anyone able to ‘concretize’, i.e., to realize and effect the reality of origin and the present in its entirety, supersedes ‘beginning’ and ‘end’ and the mere here and now.[65]
Whether this ever-present origin is cast in terms of the Taoist golden elixir (jindan), the Buddha-element of Tibetan alchemy (buddha-dhātu), or, in western alchemical cosmologies, as the logos or potential cosmos subsisting as both initium and telos in the originary chaos, many of the world’s alchemical traditions cohere in viewing the ‘goal’ of alchemy not as the creation of some future perfection, but as the rendering present of a pre-existent, eternal incorruptibility. Whether alchemy proceeds by ‘progress’ or ‘reversal’, the core of the process must not be understood as reversion or advancement in a rigidly temporal sense, but rather as a process of ‘polishing the mirror’. It is a purification of temporal accretions in order to let the boundless existentiating Urgrund shine forth in an unobstructed, uninhibited manner according to its innate, diaphanous nature.
References
1. Charles Baudelaire, ‘L’Art romantique’, in Œuvres completes de Charles Baudelaire (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1885), vol. 3, 68: ‘de tirer l’éternel du transitoire’.
2. Jack Lindsay, The Origins of Alchemy in Graeco-Roman Egypt (London: Frederick Muller, ), 382-92. Lindsay came very close to encapsulating the ‘essence’ of the alchemical process when he said it consisted in ‘the vision of unitary process and nodal points of qualitative change’. It was this qualitative and unitive element which defined the spirit of alchemy; modern chemistry, lacking this qualitative spirit, was by contrast ‘not just alchemy without the nonsense; it was alchemy tamed, reduced wholly to a quantitative level, and thus giving up its ghost’. Lindsay observes that the methodological precisions of quantitative science were necessary but the science that emerged developed at the expense of the essential vision of and relationship with the qualititative aspect of nature that was the unique province of alchemy.
3. See my contribution to part two Alchemical Traditions: ‘Agent of all Mutations: Metallurgical, Biological and Spiritual Evolution in the Alchemy of René Schwaller de Lubicz’.
4. Principally Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger. See in particular Dilthey, Selected Works, vol. 1 (ed. and trans. Makkreel and Rodi, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), who was in fact reviving a long-standing tradition of textual interpretation rooted in biblical exegesis; and Steven D. Kepnes, ‘Bridging the Gap between Understanding and Explanation: Approaches to the Study of Religion’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 25 (1986): 504-12.
5. H. T. Hakl, ‘The Symbology of Hermeticism According to Julius Evola’ in Lux in Tenebris: The Visual and the Symbolic in Western Esotericism (ed. Peter Forshaw, et al.; forthcoming, Leiden: Brill, 2013).
6. Given this interweaving lineage, the term alchemy itself is perhaps intentionally polyvalent, being intended to evoke not a single linguistic origin, per modern linguistic requirements, but rather, through the associations of ‘folk’ etymology, to encapsulate something of the multiplicity of meanings that have adhered to the term over time. Be that as it may, the clearest notes of etymological resonance have been struck in the Chinese and Graeco-Egyptian linguistic registers.
7. See in particular: F. Sezgin, Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums (Leiden: Brill, 1971), IV, 1-299; M. Ullmann, Die Natur- und Geheimwissenschaften im Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1972), 144-270; Ullmann, ‘al-kīmiyā’ in Encyclopedia of Islam, second edition (Leiden: Brill, 1986), V, 110-15; Ullmann, ‘al-kīmiyā,’ in Wörterbuch der klassischen arabischen Sprache, 1 (Wiesbaden, 1970-); Z. R. W. M. von Martels, ed., Alchemy Revisited (Leiden: Brill, 1990); Charles Burnett, ‘The Astrologer’s Assay of the Alchemist: Early References to Alchemy in Arabic and Latin Texts,’ Ambix 39, 3 (1992): 103-9.
8. Collection des anciens alchimistes grecs (Paris: Georges Steinheil, 1887).
9. LSJ, vide: χυμα; On the Greek metallurgical etymology in refutation of the Egyptian etymology, see H. Diels, Antike Technik: Sechs Vorträge (Leipzig: Teubner, 1914). The Greek etymology itself goes back at least as far as the turn of the seventeenth century.
10. Cf. John Harris, Lexicon Technicum: or, an Universal English Dictionary of Arts and Sciences Explaining not only the Terms of Art, but the Arts Themselves (London, 1704), unpaginated. Note here that Harris adduces chymos, ‘juice’, on which the Chinese and Indian terminology must be compared (see below: jin i, rasāyana).
11. For further discussion, see the very interesting essay by Procopios D. Zacharias, ‘Chymeutike: The Real Hellenic Chemistry’, Ambix 5 (1956): 117-8. Zacharias draws on the generally neglected work of K. Stephanides, who ‘in fourteen publications between 1903 and 1910, commented on and corrected the work of Berthelot, and by consideration of other sources threw much light on this obscure and misunderstood aspect of the history of chemistry’ (116).
12. Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, 33; Frank Cole Babbitt (trans.), Moralia vol. V (Loeb, 1936), 83. The Egyptian thesis (chēmia  chem-) appears to have been first put forward in modern times by Hermann Conring, De Hermetica Medicina (1648), 19; though, as Bain suggests (see discussion in chapter 1, with refs), it appears to have been current in antiquity.
13. Cheak, ‘The Perfect Black: Egypt and Alchemy’.
14. Erik Iversen, Egyptian and Hermetic Doctrine (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1984), passim.
15. See Uždavinys’ contribution to the present volume: ‘Telestic Transformation and Philosophical Rebirth: From Ancient Egypt to Neoplatonism’.
16. Peter Kingsley, ‘From Pythagoras to the Turba Philosophorum: Egypt and Pythagorean Tradition’, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 57 (1994): 1-13; Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, Magic: Empedocles and Pythagorean Tradition (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1995), 55-68, 298-9, 317 ff, 335-347, 371-91.
17. Joseph Needham, et al., Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 5, part 4: Spagyrical Discovery and Invention: Apparatus, Theories, Gifts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 353, citing Mahdihassan: jin i, ‘gold juice, gold liquid’; on ‘gold fluid, potable gold’, cf. further: Wu Lu-ch’iang, and Tenney L. Davis, ‘An Ancient Chinese Alchemical Classic: Ko Hung on the Gold Medicine and on the Yellow and the White; The Fourth and Sixteenth Chapters of the Pao-p’u-tzu’, Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 70 (1935): 221-84; of jin i, Needham remarks: ‘the ancient pronunciation […] would have been kiem iak’. Cf. Homer H. Dubs, ‘The Origin of Alchemy’, Ambix 9 (1961): 34: ‘This Chinese phrase, jin-yi […], was pronounced in T’ang times at the imperial capital as ki[e]m-iök. This phrase means, literally, ‘the juice (or sperm) of gold’. It was one of the common Chinese names for the elixir of immortality. Like other alchemical phrases, it disappeared from usage with the decay of Chinese alchemy’.
18. Needham, 5.4, 355; transliteration modified.
19. See especially Fabrizio Pregadio, ‘Jindan’, The Encyclopedia of Taoism (ed. Fabrizio Pregadio, London: Routledge, 2008), vol. 1, 551-55.
20. Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 2: History of Scientific Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), 243 ff.
21. Notable studies in these fields include M. Berthelot and C. E. Ruelle, Collection des anciens alchimistes grecs, 3 vols. (Paris: Georges Steinheil, 1888–1889); Ruska, Arabische Alchimisten (Weisbaden, 1924; reprint 1977); Julius Ruska, Tabula Smaragdina: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der hermetischen Literatur (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1926); Ruska, Turba Philosophorum: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Alchemie (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1931); Ruska, Das Buch der Alaune und Salze: Ein Grundwerk der spätlateinischen Alchemie (Berlin: Verlag Chemie, 1935); Ruska, Al-Razes Buch Geheminis der Geheimnisse mit Einleitung und Erläuterungen in deutscher Ubersetzung (Berlin, 1937); Paul Kraus, Jabir ibn Hayyan: Contribution à l’histoire des idées scientifiques dans l’Islam, 2 vols. (Cairo: 1942-3; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1986); E. O. von Lippman, Austehung und Verbreitung der Alchemie, 3 vols. (Berlin: Springer, 1919, 1931; Weinheim/Bergstrasse: Verlag Chemie, 1954); Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954–2008); Mircea Eliade, Forgerons et alchimistes (Paris: Flammarion, 1956) = The Forge and the Crucible (New York: Harper, 1962); Lama Anagarika Govinda, Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism (London: Rider & Co., 1960); Nathan Sivin, Chinese Alchemy: Preliminary Studies (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1968); Jack Lindsay, The Origins of Alchemy in Graeco-Roman Egypt (London: Frederick Muller, 1970); Martin Plessner, Vorsokratische Philosophie und griechische Alchemie in arabisch-lateinischer Überlieferung (Weisbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1975); Edward Todd Fenner, Rasayana Siddhi: Medicine and Alchemy in the Buddhist Tantras (PhD dissertation: University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1979); Robert Halleux, Les Textes alchimiques: Typologie des sources du moyen age occidental (Turnhout-Belgium: Brepols, 1979); François Daumas, ‘L’Alchimie a-t-elle une origine égyptienne?’, in Das römisch-byzantinische Ägypten: Akten des internationalen Symposions 26.–30. September 1978 in Trier (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1983); Henry Corbin, Alchimie comme art hiératique (ed. Pierre Lory, Paris: L’Herne, 1986); Phillipe Derchaine, ‘L’Atelier des Orfèvres à Dendara et les origines de l’alchimie’, Chronique d’Égypte 129 (1990): 219–42; David Gordon White, The Alchemical Body: Sidha Traditions in Medieval India (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994); B. D. Haage, Alchemie im Mittelalter: Ideen und Bilder—von Zosimos bis Paracelsus (Munich: Artemis & Winkler, 1996); William R. Newman and Lawrence M. Principe, Alchemy Tried in the Fire: Starkey, Boyle, and the Fate of Helmontian Chymistry (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002), to name but a few.
22. Antoine Faivre, Access to Western Esotericism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); ‘Questions of Terminology Proper to the Study of Esoteric Currents in Modern and Contemporary Europe’, in Western Esotericism and the Science of Religion: Selected Papers Presented at the 17th Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions, Mexico City, 1995, eds. Antoine Faivre and Wouter J. Hanegraaff (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 1998), 1–10; Wouter J. Hanegraaff, ‘Empirical Method in the Study of Esotericism’, Method and Theory in the Study of Religion (1995): 99–129; ‘The Birth of a Discipline’, in Western Esotericism and the Science of Religion, vii-xvii; ‘On the Construction of ‘Esoteric Traditions’’, in Western Esotericism and the Science of Religion, 11–61; ‘Beyond the Yates Paradigm: The Study of Western Esotericism between Counterculture and New Complexity’, Aries 1, 1 (2001): 5–37.
23. Cf. Kocku von Stuckrad, Western Esotericism: A Brief History of Secret Knowledge (London: Equinox, 2005), 6–11, who makes the distinction between a religious or esoteric ‘tradition’ and a religious or esoteric ‘field of discourse’; he also discusses the importance of recognising the complexity of esoteric identities.
24. See Kingsley, ‘Poimandres: The Etymology of the Name and the Origins of the Hermetica’, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 56 (1993): 1-24.
25. Significant studies in this respect include the work of J. R. Partington, A History of Chemistry, 4 vols. (London, MacMillan. 1961–1970); Walter Pagel, Paracelsus: An Introduction to Philosophical Medicine in the Era of the Renaissance (Basel: Karger, 1982); Allen G. Debus, The English Paracelsians (Oldbourne Press: History of science library, 1965); Debus, The Chemical Philosophy: Paracelsian Science and Medicine in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (1977, 2002); A. G. Debus and M. T. Walton, eds., Reading the Book of Nature: The Other Side of the Scientific Revolution (Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies) (Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1998); Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954–2008); Mircea Eliade, Forgerons et alchimistes (Paris: Flammarion, 1956); Henry Corbin, Alchimie comme art hiératique (ed. Pierre Lory, Paris: L’Herne, 1986); William R. Newman and Lawrence M. Principe, Alchemy Tried in the Fire: Starkey, Boyle, and the Fate of Helmontian Chymistry (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002), amongst others.
26. On the term chymistry, see William R. Newman and Lawrence M. Principe, ‘Alchemy vs. Chemistry: The Etymological Origins of a Historiographic Mistake’, Early Science and Medicine, 3, 1 (1998): 32–65.
27. Cf. in particular Mary Anne Atwood, A Suggestive Enquiry into the Hermetic Mystery (Belfast: William Tait, 1918).
28. Lawrence M. Principe, ‘Alchemy I: Introduction’, in Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism, ed. W. Hanegraaff (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 13.
29. See F. Sherwood Taylor, ‘The Alchemical Works of Stephanos of Alexandria: Translation and Commentary, Part I’, Ambix 1 (1937): 116–39; ‘The Alchemical Works of Stephanos of Alexandria: Translation and Commentary, Part II’, Ambix 1 (1937): 39–49. Quotation modified.
30. Lawrence M. Principe, ‘Alchemy’, DGWE, 12.
31. Carl Gustav Jung, Psychologie und Alchemie (Zurich, 1944); Jung, Mysterium coniunctionis: Untersuchungen über die Trennung und Zusammensetzung der seelischen Gegensatze in der alchemie (Zurich, 1955); Jung, ‘Studien über alchemistische Vorstellungen’, C. G. Jung Gesammelte Werke, vol. 13 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter-Verlag, 1978).
32. Principe, ‘Alchemy’, DGWE, 14.
33. Hereward Tilton, The Quest for the Phoenix: Spiritual Alchemy and Rosicrucianism in the Work of Count Michael Maier (1569–1622) (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), 256, with 9–18, 235–6, 253–6.
34. Rasārnava 17. 164–5: yathā lohe tathā dehe kartavhah sūtakah sadā/ samānam kurute devi pravishan dehalohayoh/ pūrvam lohe parīksheta tato dehe prayojayet; David Gordon White, The Alchemical Body: Siddha Traditions in Medieval India (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996), 315 with 446 n. 21, and passim.
35. Nathan Sivin, Chinese Alchemy: Preliminary Studies. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1968); Sivin, ‘Chinese Alchemy and the Manipulation of Time’, Isis 67, no. 4 (1976): 513–26; Sivin, ‘The Theoretical Background of Elixir Alchemy’, in Joseph Needham et al., Science and Civilisation in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), vol. 5.4, 210–305; Fabrizio Pregadio, Awakening to Reality: The ‘Regulated Verses’ of the Wuzhen pian, a Taoist Classic of Internal Alchemy (Golden Elixir Press, 2009); Pregadio, The Seal of the Unity of the Three, vol. 1: A Study and Translation of the Cantong qi, the Source of the Taoist Way of the Golden Elixir (Golden Elixir Press, 2011).
36. See Edward Todd Fenner, Rasayana Siddhi: Medicine and Alchemy in the Buddhist Tantras (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979).
37. Corbin, ‘Le « Livre des sept Statues » d’Apollonios de Tyane, commenté par Jaldakī’, Alchimie comme art hiératique, ed. Pierre Lory (Paris: L’Herne, 1986), 63-4, 71-3.
38. Jacques Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, in Dissemination (trans. Barbara Johnson, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 70.
39. Derrida, Dissemination, 127.
40. Kalimāt maknūna (Sayings Kept Secret), ch. xxx (Teheran, 1801), 68-70; (Bombay, 1296/1878), 69-72; trans. Henry Corbin, Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth, 177. 
41. In Latin: Quod est inferius est sicut quod est superius, et quod est superius est sicut quod est inferius, ad perpetranda miracula rei unius.
42. Proclus, Hier. Art., 148, cited in Uždavinys, ed., The Golden Chain: An Anthology of Pythagorean and Platonic Philosophy (Bloomington, Indiana: World Wisdom, 2004), 300.
43. Here the a- as alpha privativum indicates not simply ‘negation of’ but ‘freedom from’ duality.
44. David Loy, Nondualism: A Study in Comparative Philosophy (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1988), 3.
45. Gebser’s seminal work, Ursprung und Gegenwart, is contained in his Gesamtausgabe, vols. 2-4 (ed. Hämmerli, Schaffhausen: Novalis, 1999); cf. The Ever-Present Origin (trans. Noel Barstad and Algis Mickunas, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985). What Gebser describes requires an effort to place the entire basis of rational epistemology within a deeper, more complex, and ultimately more integral process—one that incorporates, but is not exclusively reduced to, the ontologies of its component ‘parts’.
46. William Blake, Auguries of Innocence, The Ballads (or Pickering) Manuscript, c. 1801–3:  ‘To see a World in a Grain of Sand’ / And a Heaven in a Wild Flower, / Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand / And Eternity in an hour’.
47. Just as alchemy straddles the history of science and religion, so too may this ‘ground’ or ‘field’ of being be understood from both scientific and spiritual perspectives, e.g. via David Bohm’s ‘implicate’ versus ‘explicate’ orders of existence in quantum cosmology, or via the concept of āśraya, the ‘primordial ground of being’ in the Dzogchen tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. Such layers, though, must be understood as kataphatic attempts at explicating what in the final analysis remains apophatic.
48. For discussion, see especially Kevin Van Bladel, The Arabic Hermes: From Pagan Sage to Prophet of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 48-54.
49. Berthelot, CAAG, 1.2.1.
50. Berthelot, CAAG, 1.2.1: ‘La nature jouit de la nature; la nature triomphe de la nature; la nature maîtrise la nature’.
51. Berthelot, CAAG, 2.3; George Syncellus, 297.23–25 (§471); Alden A. Mosshammer, ed., Georgii Syncelli Ecloga chronographica (Leipzig: Teubner, 1984).
52. Berthelot, La Chimie au moyen age, ‘Lettres de Pébéchius’, vol. 2, 309-12; Kevin Van Bladel, The Arabic Hermes, 48-50.
53. ‘Lettres de Pébéchius’, in Berthelot, La Chimie au moyen age, vol. 2, 312: ‘il retraça un dragon qui mange sa queue … des images, œuvres d’art d’un caractère symbolique’.
54. Berthelot, CAAG, 1.1. Synthemata is a technical term in theurgy; it can be translated as ‘synthemes, symbols, signatures, talismans’.
55. Zosimos, ‘Peri tou theiou hydatos’; Berthelot, CAAG, 3.9.
56. Needless to say, this commonplace of comparative mythography also applies to the sun-moon or sulphur-mercury dyads of the Graeco-Egyptian, Islamicate and European alchemical traditions.
57. Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 5.4, 382-3.
58. Teng Shu-P’Ing, ‘The Original Significance of Bi Discs: Insights Based on Liangzhu Jade Bi with Incised Symbolic Motifs’, Journal of East Asian Archaeology, 2.1-2 (2000): 165-194.
59. The path of cosmogenesis is epitomised in the Daodejing as follows: ‘The Tao produced One; One produced Two; Two produced Three; Three produced All things’; Daodejing § 42, trans. James Legge; Sacred Books of the East, vol. 39; ed. Max Müller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1891.
60. The Daodejing’s formula of cosmogonic processio and its alchemical reversal is mirrored by the axiom of Maria Prophetissa, a Hellenistic Jewish alchemist from the first centures ce: ‘One becomes two, two becomes three, and out of the third comes the one as the fourth’.
61. Cf. especially Eliade , Forgerons et alchimistes (Paris: Flammarion, 1956), passim.
62. CAAG, 3.1,: ‘règles de la combinaison’. English translation: F. Sherwood Taylor, ‘The Visions of Zosimos’, Ambix 1.1 (1937), 88-92.
63. CAAG, 3.1; Taylor, ‘The Visions of Zosimos’, 88-92.
64. Berthelot, CAAG, 3.1; Taylor, ‘The Visions of Zosimos’, 88-92.
65. Gebser, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 2, 15: ‘Der Ursprung ist immer gegenwärtig. Er ist kein Anfang, denn aller Anfang ist zeitgebunden. Und die Gegenwart ist nicht das bloße Jetzt, das Heute, oder der Augenblick. Sie ist nicht ein Zeitteil, sondern eine ganzheitliche Leistung und damit auch immer ursprünglich. Wer es vermag, Ursprung und Gegenwart als Ganzheit zu Wirkung und Wirklichkeit zu bringen, sie zu konkretisieren, der überwindet Anfang und Ende und die bloß heutige Zeit’. Gebser, The Ever-Present Origin (trans. Noel Barstad and Algis Mickunas, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985), xxvii.

 

Wednesday, 28 November 2012

Thomas Aquinas

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St. Thomas Aquinas
BornThomas Aquinas
About 1225[1]
Roccasecca, Kingdom of Sicily
Died7 March 1274[1]
Fossanova, Papal States
OccupationPriest, Philosopher, Theologian
EthnicityItalian[2][3][4]
EducationOrder of Saint Benedict
University of Naples Federico II
GenresScholasticism, Thomism
SubjectsMetaphysics, Logic, Theology, Mind, Epistemology, Ethics, Politics
Notable work(s)Summa theologiae
Summa Contra Gentiles


Saint Thomas Aquinas, O.P. (play /əˈkwnəs/ ə-KWY-nəs; 1225 – 7 March 1274), also Thomas of Aquin or Aquino, was an Italian Dominican priest of the Roman Catholic Church, and an immensely influential philosopher and theologian in the tradition of scholasticism, within which he is also known as The "Dumb Ox" "Angelic Doctor", Doctor Communis, and Doctor Universalis.[5] "Aquinas" is the demonym of Aquino: Thomas came from one of the noblest families of the Kingdom of Naples, with the title of "counts of Aquino". He was the foremost classical proponent of natural theology, and the father of Thomism. His influence on Western thought is considerable, and much of modern philosophy was conceived in development or refutation of his ideas, particularly in the areas of ethics, natural law, metaphysics, and political theory.
Thomas is held in the Catholic Church to be the model teacher for those studying for the priesthood, and indeed the highest expression of both natural reason and speculative theology. The study of his works, according to papal and magisterial documents, is a core of the required program of study for those seeking ordination as priests or deacons, as well as for those in religious formation and for other students of the sacred disciplines (Catholic philosophy, theology, history, liturgy, and canon law).[6] The works for which he is best-known are the Summa theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentiles. One of the 35 Doctors of the Church, he is considered the Church's greatest theologian and philosopher. Pope Benedict XV declared: "This (Dominican) Order ... acquired new luster when the Church declared the teaching of Thomas to be her own and that Doctor, honored with the special praises of the Pontiffs, the master and patron of Catholic schools."[7]

Contents

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[edit] Biography

[edit] Dominican (1225–1244)

Thomas was born in Roccasecca c. January 28, 1225, according to some authors, in the castle of his father, Landulf of Aquino, Roccasecca being in the Contea di Aquino (at that time in the Kingdom of Sicily. In present-day Italy, it is in the Lazio region). Thomas' father didn’t belong to the most powerful branch of the family and simply held the title miles, while Thomas' mother, Dame Theodora, belonged to the Rossi branch of the Neapolitan Caracciolo family.[8] Landulf's brother Sinibald was abbot of the original Benedictine abbey at Monte Cassino. While the rest of the family's sons pursued military careers,[9] the family intended for Thomas to follow his uncle into the abbacy;[10] this would have been a normal career path for a younger son of southern Italian nobility.[11]
At the age of five, Thomas began his early education at Monte Cassino but after the military conflict that broke out between the Emperor Frederick II and Pope Gregory IX spilled into the abbey in early 1239, Landulf and Theodora had Thomas enrolled at the studium generale (university) recently established by Frederick in Naples.[12] It was here that Thomas was probably introduced to Aristotle, Averroes and Maimonides, all of whom would influence his theological philosophy.[13] It was also during his study at Naples that Thomas came under the influence of John of St. Julian, a Dominican preacher in Naples, who was part of the active effort by the Dominican order to recruit devout followers.[14] There his teacher in arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music was Petrus de Ibernia.[15]
At age nineteen, Thomas resolved to join the Dominican Order. Thomas's change of heart did not please his family, who had expected him to become a Benedictine monk and perhaps the abbot of the powerful Montecassino Abbey near his family's domains.[16] In an attempt to prevent Theodora's interference in Thomas's choice, the Dominicans arranged for Thomas to be removed to Rome, and from Rome, sent to Paris.[17] However, on his journey to Rome his brothers, per Theodora's instructions, seized him as he was drinking from a spring and took him back to his parents at the castle of Monte San Giovanni Campano.[17]
Thomas was held prisoner for two years in the family castles at Monte San Giovanni and Roccasecca in an attempt to prevent him from assuming the Dominican habit and to push him into renouncing his new aspiration.[13] Political concerns prevented the Pope from ordering Thomas's release, which had the effect of extending Thomas' detention.[18] Thomas passed this time of trial tutoring his sisters and communicating with members of the Dominican Order.[13] Family members became desperate to dissuade Thomas, who remained determined to join the Dominicans. At one point, two of his brothers resorted to the measure of hiring a prostitute to seduce him. According to legend Thomas drove her away wielding a fire iron. That night two angels appeared to him as he slept and strengthened his determination to remain celibate.[19]

Diego Velázquez, Aquinas is girded by angels with a mystical belt of purity after his proof of chastity.
By 1244, seeing that all of her attempts to dissuade Thomas had failed, Theodora sought to save the family's dignity, arranging for Thomas to escape at night through his window. In her mind, a secret escape from detention was less damaging than an open surrender to the Dominicans. Thomas was sent first to Naples and then to Rome to meet Johannes von Wildeshausen, the Master General of the Dominican Order.[20]

[edit] Paris, Cologne, Albert Magnus, and first Paris regency (1245–1259)

In 1245, Thomas was sent to study at the University of Paris' Faculty of Arts where he most likely met Dominican scholar Albertus Magnus,[21] then the Chair of Theology at the College of St. James in Paris.[22] When Albertus was sent by his superiors to teach at the new studium generale at Cologne in 1248,[21] Thomas followed him, declining Pope Innocent IV's offer to appoint him abbot of Monte Cassino as a Dominican.[10] Albertus then appointed the reluctant Thomas magister studentium.[11] When Thomas failed his first theological disputation, Albertus prophetically exclaimed: "We call him the dumb ox, but in his teaching he will one day produce such a bellowing that it will be heard throughout the world."[10]
Thomas taught in Cologne as an apprentice professor (baccalaureus biblicus), instructing students on the books of the Old Testament and writing Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram (Literal Commentary on Isaiah), Postilla super Ieremiam (Commentary on Jeremiah) and Postilla super Threnos (Commentary on Lamentations).[23] Then in 1252 he returned to Paris to study for the master's degree in theology. He lectured on the Bible as an apprentice professor, and upon becoming a baccalaureus Sententiarum (bachelor of the Sentences)[24] devoted his final three years of study to commenting on Peter Lombard's Sentences. In the first of his four theological syntheses, Thomas composed a massive commentary on the Sentences entitled Scriptum super libros Sententiarium (Commentary on the Sentences). Aside from his masters writings, he wrote De ente et essentia (On Being and Essence) for his fellow Dominicans in Paris.[10]
In the spring of 1256, Thomas was appointed regent master in theology at Paris and one of his first works upon assuming this office was Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem (Against Those Who Assail the Worship of God and Religion), defending the mendicant orders which had come under attack by William of Saint-Amour.[25] During his tenure from 1256 to 1259, Thomas wrote numerous works, including: Questiones disputatae de veritate (Disputed Questions on Truth), a collection of twenty-nine disputed questions on aspects of faith and the human condition[26] prepared for the public university debates he presided over on Lent and Advent;[27] Quaestiones quodlibetales (Quodlibetal Questions), a collection of his responses to questions posed to him by the academic audience;[26] and both Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate (Commentary on Boethius's De trinitate) and Expositio super librum Boethii De hebdomadibus (Commentary on Boethius's De hebdomadibus), commentaries on the works of 6th century philosopher Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius.[28] By the end of his regency, Thomas was working on one of his most famous works, Summa contra Gentiles.[29]
Saint Thomas Aquinas

St. Thomas Aquinas by Fra Bartolomeo
Doctor of the Church
Bornc. 1225
Aquino, Kingdom of Sicily
Died7 March 1274
Fossanova Abbey, Kingdom of Sicily
Honored inRoman Catholic Church
Anglican Communion
Lutheranism
CanonizedJuly 18, 1323, Avignon, France by Pope John XXII
Major shrineChurch of the Jacobins, Toulouse, France
Feast28 January (new), 7 March (old)
AttributesThe Summa theologiae, a model church, the Sun
PatronageAcademics; against storms; against lightning; apologists; Aquino, Italy; Belcastro, Italy; book sellers; Catholic academies, schools, and universities; chastity; Falerna, Italy; learning; pencil makers; philosophers; publishers; scholars; students; theologians.[30]

[edit] Naples, Orvieto, Rome (1259–1268)

In 1259 Thomas completed his first regency at the studium generale and left Paris so that others in his order could gain this teaching experience. He returned to Naples where he was appointed as general preacher by the provincial chapter of September 29, 1260. In September 1261 he was called to Orvieto as conventual lector responsible for the pastoral formation of the friars unable to attend a studium generale. In Orvieto Thomas completed his Summa contra Gentiles, wrote the Catena aurea, (The Golden Chain),[31] and produced works for Pope Urban IV such as the liturgy for the newly created feast of Corpus Christi and the Contra errores graecorum (Against the Errors of the Greeks).[29]
In February 1265 the newly elected Pope Clement IV summoned Aquinas to Rome to serve as papal theologian. This same year he was ordered by the Dominican Chapter of Agnani[32] to teach at the studium conventuale at the Roman convent of Santa Sabina which had been founded some years before in 1222.[33] The studium at Santa Sabina now became an experiment for the Dominicans, the Order's first studium provinciale, an intermediate school between the studium conventuale and the studium generale. "Prior to this time the Roman Province had offered no specialized education of any sort, no arts, no philosophy; only simple convent schools, with their basic courses in theology for resident friars, were functioning in Tuscany and the meridionale during the first several decades of the order's life. But the new studium at Santa Sabina was to be a school for the province," a studium provinciale.[34] Tolomeo da Lucca, an associate and early biographer of Aquinas, tells us that at the Santa Sabina studium Aquinas taught the full range of philosophical subjects, both moral and natural.[35]
While at the Santa Sabina studium provinciale Thomas began his most famous work the Summa theologiae,[31] which he conceived of specifically as suited to beginning students: "Because a doctor of catholic truth ought not only to teach the proficient, but to him pertains also to instruct beginners. as the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 3: 1-2, as to infants in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not meat, our proposed intention in this work is to convey those things that pertain to the Christian religion, in a way that is fitting to the instruction of beginners."[36] While there he also wrote a variety of other works like his unfinished Compendium Theologiae and Responsio ad fr. Ioannem Vercellensem de articulis 108 sumptis ex opere Petri de Tarentasia (Reply to Brother John of Vercelli Regarding 108 Articles Drawn from the Work of Peter of Tarentaise).[28] In his position as head of the studium Aquinas conducted a series of important disputations on the power of God, which he compiled into his De potentia.[37] Nicholas Brunacci [1240-1322] was among Aquinas' students at the Santa Sabina studium provinciale and later at the Paris studium generale. In November 1268 he was with Aquinas and his associate and secretary Reginald of Piperno, as they left Viterbo on their way to Paris to begin the academic year.[38] Another student of Aquinas' at the Santa Sabina studium provinciale was Blessed Tommasello da Perugia.[39]
Aquinas remained at the studium at Santa Sabina from 1265 until he was called back to Paris in 1268 for a second teaching regency.[37] With his departure for Paris in 1268 and the passage of time the pedagogical activities of the studium provinciale at Santa Sabina were divided between two campuses. A new convent of the Order at the Church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva had a modest beginning in 1255 as a community for women converts, but grew rapidly in size and importance after being given over to the Dominicans friars in 1275.[40] In 1288 the theology component of the provincial curriculum for the education of the friars was relocated from the Santa Sabina studium provinciale to the studium conventuale at Santa Maria sopra Minerva which was redesignated as a studium particularis theologiae.[41] This studium was transformed in the 16th century into the College of Saint Thomas (Latin: Collegium Divi Thomæ). In the 20th century the college was relocated to the convent of Saints Dominic and Sixtus and was transformed into the Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelicum.

[edit] The quarrelsome second Paris regency (1269–1272)

In 1268 the Dominican Order assigned Thomas to be regent master at the University of Paris for a second time, a position he held until the spring of 1272. Part of the reason for this sudden reassignment appears to have arisen from the rise of "Averroism" or "radical Aristotelianism" in the universities. In response to these perceived evils, Thomas wrote two works, one of them being De unitate intellectus, contra Averroistas (On the Unity of Intellect, against the Averroists) in which he blasts Averroism as incompatible with Christian doctrine.[42] During his second regency, he finished the second part of the Summa and wrote De virtutibus and De aeternitate mundi,[37] the latter of which dealt with controversial Averroist and Aristotelian beginninglessness of the world.[43] Disputes with some important Franciscans such as Bonaventure and John Peckham conspired to make his second regency much more difficult and troubled than the first. A year before Thomas re-assumed the regency at the 1266–67 Paris disputations, Franciscan master William of Baglione accused Thomas of encouraging Averroists, calling him the "blind leader of the blind". Thomas called these individuals the murmurantes (Grumblers).[43] In reality, Thomas was deeply disturbed by the spread of Averroism and was angered when he discovered Siger of Brabant teaching Averroistic interpretations of Aristotle to Parisian students.[44] On 10 December 1270, the bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, issued an edict condemning thirteen Aristotlelian and Averroistic propositions as heretical and excommunicating anyone who continued to support them.[45] Many in the ecclesiastical community, the so-called Augustinians, were fearful that this introduction of Aristotelianism and the more extreme Averroism might somehow contaminate the purity of the Christian faith. In what appears to be an attempt to counteract the growing fear of Aristotelian thought, Thomas conducted a series of disputations between 1270 and 1272: De virtutibus in communi (On Virtues in General), De virtutibus cardinalibus (On Cardinal Virtues), De spe (On Hope).[46]

[edit] Final days and “Straw” (1272–1274)

In 1272 Thomas took leave from the University of Paris when the Dominicans from his home province called upon him to establish a studium generale wherever he liked and staff it as he pleased. He chose to establish the institution in Naples, and moved there to take his post as regent master.[37] He took his time at Naples to work on the third part of the Summa while giving lectures on various religious topics. On 6 December 1273 at the Dominican convent of Naples in the Chapel of Saint Nicholas after Matins Thomas lingered and was seen by the sacristan Domenic of Caserta to be levitating in prayer with tears before an icon of the crucified Christ. Christ said to Thomas, "You have written well of me, Thomas. What reward would you have for your labor?" Thomas responded, "Nothing but you Lord." [47] [48] After this exchange something happened, but Thomas never spoke of it or wrote it down. Because of what he saw, he abandoned his routine and refused to dictate to his socius Reginald of Piperno. When Reginald begged him to get back to work, Thomas replied: “Reginald, I cannot, because all that I have written seems like straw to me”[49] (mihi videtur ut palea).[50] What exactly triggered Thomas's change in behavior is believed by Catholics to have been some kind of supernatural experience of God.[51] After taking to his bed, he did recover some strength.[52]
In 1054, a long-lasting schism had occurred between the Catholic Church and the churches in communion with the Patriarch of Constantinople, later known as the Eastern Orthodox. Looking to find a way to reunite the Eastern Orthodox churches with the Catholic Church Pope Gregory X convened the Second Council of Lyon to be held on 1 May 1274 and summoned Thomas to attend.[53] At the meeting, Thomas's work for Pope Urban IV concerning the Greeks, Contra errores graecorum, was to be presented.[54] On his way to the Council, riding on a donkey along the Appian Way,[53] he struck his head on the branch of a fallen tree and became seriously ill again. He was then quickly escorted to Monte Cassino to convalesce.[52] After resting for a while, he set out again, but stopped at the Cistercian Fossanova Abbey after again falling ill.[55] The monks nursed him for several days, and as he received his last rites he prayed: "I receive Thee, ransom of my soul. For love of Thee have I studied and kept vigil, toiled, preached and taught...."[56] He died on 7 March 1274[55] while giving commentary on the Song of Songs.[57]

[edit] Condemnation of 1277

In 1277 Etienne Tempier, the same bishop of Paris who had issued the condemnation of 1270, issued another more extensive condemnation. One aim of this condemnation was to clarify that God's absolute power transcended any principles of logic that Aristotle or Averroes might place on it.[58] More specifically, it contained a list of 219 propositions that the bishop had determined to violate the omnipotence of God, and included in this list were twenty Thomistic propositions. Their inclusion badly damaged Thomas's reputation for many years.[59]
In The Divine Comedy, Dante sees the glorified soul of Thomas in the Heaven of the Sun with the other great exemplars of religious wisdom.[60] Dante asserts that Thomas died by poisoning, on the order of Charles of Anjou;[61] Villani (ix. 218) cites this belief, and the Anonimo Fiorentino describes the crime and its motive. But the historian Ludovico Antonio Muratori reproduces the account made by one of Thomas's friends, and this version of the story gives no hint of foul play.[62]
Thomas's theology had begun its rise to prestige. Two centuries later, in 1567, Pope Pius V proclaimed St. Thomas Aquinas a Doctor of the Church and ranked his feast with those of the four great Latin fathers: Ambrose, Augustine of Hippo, Jerome, and Gregory. However, in the same period the Council of Trent still turned to Duns Scotus before Thomas as a source of arguments in defence of the Church. Even though Duns Scotus was more consulted at the Council of Trent, Thomas had the honor of having his Summa theologiae placed on the altar alongside the Bible and the Decretals.[59][63]
In his encyclical of 4 August 1879, Pope Leo XIII stated that Thomas's theology was a definitive exposition of Catholic doctrine. Thus, he directed the clergy to take the teachings of Thomas as the basis of their theological positions. Leo XIII also decreed that all Catholic seminaries and universities must teach Thomas's doctrines, and where Thomas did not speak on a topic, the teachers were "urged to teach conclusions that were reconcilable with his thinking." In 1880, Saint Thomas Aquinas was declared patron of all Catholic educational establishments.

[edit] Canonization

When the devil's advocate at his canonization process objected that there were no miracles, one of the cardinals answered, "Tot miraculis, quot articulis"—"there are as many miracles (in his life) as articles (in his Summa)," viz., thousands.[63] Fifty years after the death of Thomas, on 18 July 1323, Pope John XXII, seated in Avignon, pronounced Thomas a saint.[64]
In a monastery at Naples, near the cathedral of St. Januarius, a cell in which he supposedly lived is still shown to visitors. His remains were placed in the Church of the Jacobins in Toulouse in 1369. Between 1789 and 1974, they were held in Basilique de Saint-Sernin, Toulouse. In 1974, they were returned to the Church of the Jacobins, where they have remained ever since.
In the General Roman Calendar of 1962, in the Roman Catholic Church, Thomas was commemorated on 7 March, the day of death. However, in the General Roman Calendar of 1969, Thomas's memorial was transferred to 28 January, the date of the translation of his relics to Toulouse.[65]
Saint Thomas Aquinas is honored with a feast day in the liturgical year of the Episcopal Church in the United States of America on 28 January.

[edit] Philosophy

Thomas was a theologian and a Scholastic philosopher.[66] However, he never considered himself a philosopher, and criticized philosophers, whom he saw as pagans, for always "falling short of the true and proper wisdom to be found in Christian revelation."[67] With this in mind, Thomas did have respect for Aristotle, so much so that in the Summa, he often cites Aristotle simply as "the Philosopher." Much of his work bears upon philosophical topics, and in this sense may be characterized as philosophical. Thomas's philosophical thought has exerted enormous influence on subsequent Christian theology, especially that of the Roman Catholic Church, extending to Western philosophy in general. Thomas stands as a vehicle and modifier of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism.

[edit] Commentaries on Aristotle

Thomas wrote several important commentaries on Aristotle's works, including On the Soul, Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics. His work is associated with William of Moerbeke's translations of Aristotle from Greek into Latin.

[edit] Epistemology

Thomas believed "that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man needs divine help, that the intellect may be moved by God to its act."[68] However, he believed that human beings have the natural capacity to know many things without special divine revelation, even though such revelation occurs from time to time, "especially in regard to such (truths) as pertain to faith."[69] But this is the light that is given to man by God according to man's nature: "Now every form bestowed on created things by God has power for a determined act[uality], which it can bring about in proportion to its own proper endowment; and beyond which it is powerless, except by a superadded form, as water can only heat when heated by the fire. And thus the human understanding has a form, viz. intelligible light, which of itself is sufficient for knowing certain intelligible things, viz. those we can come to know through the senses. "[70]

[edit] Ethics

Thomas's ethics are based on the concept of "first principles of action."[71] In his Summa theologiae, he wrote:
Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act.[72]
Thomas defined the four cardinal virtues as prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude. The cardinal virtues are natural and revealed in nature, and they are binding on everyone. There are, however, three theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity. These are somewhat supernatural and are distinct from other virtues in their object, namely, God:
Now the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.[73]
Furthermore, Thomas distinguished four kinds of law: eternal, natural, human, and divine. Eternal law is the decree of God that governs all creation. Natural law is the human "participation" in the eternal law and is discovered by reason.[74] Natural law, of course, is based on "first principles":
. . . this is the first precept of the law, that good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based on this . . .[75]
The desires to live and to procreate are counted by Thomas among those basic (natural) human values on which all human values are based. According to Thomas, all human tendencies are geared towards real human goods. In this case, the human nature in question is marriage, the total gift of oneself to another that ensures a family for children and a future for mankind.[76] To clarify for Christian believers, Thomas defined love as "to will the good of another."[77]
Human law is positive law: the natural law applied by governments to societies. Divine law is the specially revealed law in the scriptures.
Thomas also greatly influenced Catholic understandings of mortal and venial sins.
Thomas denied that human beings have any duty of charity to animals because they are not persons. Otherwise, it would be unlawful to use them for food. But this does not give humans the license to be cruel to them, for "cruel habits might carry over into our treatment of human beings."[78]
Thomas contributed to economic thought as an aspect of ethics and justice. He dealt with the concept of a just price, normally its market price or a regulated price sufficient to cover seller costs of production. He argued it was immoral for sellers to raise their prices simply because buyers were in pressing need for a product.[79][80]

[edit] Intentionality

The pioneer of neurodynamics, cognitive neuroscientist Walter Freeman, considers the work of Thomas important in remodeling intentionality, the directedness of the mind toward what it is aware of.

[edit] Psychology

Aquinas maintains that a human is a single material substance. He understands the soul as the form of the body, which makes a human being the composite of the two. Thus, only living, form-matter composites can truly be called human; dead bodies are “human” only analogously. One actually existing substance comes from body and soul. A human is a single material substance, but still should be understood as having an immaterial soul, which continues after bodily death.
Ultimately, humans are animals; the animal genus is body; body is material substance. When embodied, a human person is an “individual substance in the category rational animal.”[81] The body belongs to the essence of a human being. In his Summa theologiae Aquinas clearly states his position on the nature of the soul; defining it as “the first principle of life.”[82] The soul is not corporeal, or a body; it is the act of a body. Because the intellect is incorporeal, it does not use the bodily organs, as “the operation of anything follows the mode of its being.”[83]
The human soul is perfected in the body, but does not depend on the body, because part of its nature is spiritual. In this way, the soul differs from other forms, which are only found in matter, and thus depend on matter. The soul, as form of the body, does not depend on matter in this way.
The soul is not matter, not even incorporeal or spiritual matter. If it were, it would not be able to understand universals, which are immaterial. A receiver receives things according to the receiver’s own nature, so in order for soul (receiver) to understand (receive) universals, it must have the same nature as universals. Yet, any substance that understands universals may not be a matter-form composite. So, humans have rational souls which are abstract forms independent of the body. But a human being is one existing, single material substance which comes from body and soul: that is what Thomas means when he writes that “something one in nature can be formed from an intellectual substance and a body,” and “a thing one in nature does not result from two permanent entities unless one has the character of substantial form and the other of matter.”[84]
The soul is a "substantial form"; it is a part of a substance, but it is not a substance by itself. Nevertheless, the soul exists separately from the body, and continues, after death, in many of the capacities we think of as human. Substantial form is what makes a thing a member of the species to which it belongs, and substantial form is also the structure or configuration that provides the object with the abilities that make the object what it is. For humans, those abilities are those of the rational animal.
These distinctions can be better understood in the light of Aquinas’ understanding of matter and form, a hylomorphic ("matter/form") theory derived from Aristotle. In any given substance, matter and form are necessarily united, and each is a necessary aspect of that substance. However, they are conceptually separable. Matter represents what is changeable about the substance – what is potentially something else. For example, bronze matter is potentially a statue, or also potentially a cymbal. Matter must be understood as the matter of something. In contrast, form is what determines some particular chunk of matter to be a specific substance and no other. When Aquinas says that the human body is only partly composed of matter, he means the material body is only potentially a human being. The soul is what actualizes that potential into an existing human being. Consequently, the fact that a human body is live human tissue entails that a human soul is wholly present in each part of the human.

[edit] Theology


17th century sculpture of Thomas Aquinas
Thomas viewed theology, or the sacred doctrine, as a science,[51] the raw material data of which consists of written scripture and the tradition of the Catholic Church. These sources of data were produced by the self-revelation of God to individuals and groups of people throughout history. Faith and reason, while distinct but related, are the two primary tools for processing the data of theology. Thomas believed both were necessary — or, rather, that the confluence of both was necessary — for one to obtain true knowledge of God. Thomas blended Greek philosophy and Christian doctrine by suggesting that rational thinking and the study of nature, like revelation, were valid ways to understand truths pertaining to God. According to Thomas, God reveals himself through nature, so to study nature is to study God. The ultimate goals of theology, in Thomas's mind, are to use reason to grasp the truth about God and to experience salvation through that truth.

[edit] Revelation

Thomas believed that truth is known through reason (natural revelation) and faith (supernatural revelation). Supernatural revelation has its origin in the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and is made available through the teaching of the prophets, summed up in Holy Scripture, and transmitted by the Magisterium, the sum of which is called "Tradition". Natural revelation is the truth available to all people through their human nature; certain truths all men can attain from correct human reasoning. For example, he felt this applied to rational ways to know the existence of God.
Though one may deduce the existence of God and his Attributes (One, Truth, Good, Power, Knowledge) through reason, certain specifics may be known only through special revelation (such as the Trinity). In Thomas's view, special revelation is equivalent to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. The major theological components of Christianity, such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, are revealed in the teachings of the Church and the Scriptures and may not otherwise be deduced.
Supernatural revelation (faith) and natural revelation (reason) are complementary rather than contradictory in nature, for they pertain to the same unity: truth.

[edit] Creation

As a Catholic, Thomas believed that God is the "maker of heaven and earth, of all that is visible and invisible." Like Aristotle, Thomas posited that life could form from non-living material or plant life, a theory of ongoing abiogenesis known as spontaneous generation:
Since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it was not incompatible with the first formation of things, that from the corruption of the less perfect the more perfect should be generated. Hence animals generated from the corruption of inanimate things, or of plants, may have been generated then.[85]
Additionally, Thomas considered Empedocles' theory that various mutated species emerged at the dawn of Creation. Thomas reasoned that these species were generated through mutations in animal sperm, and argued that they were not unintended by nature; rather, such species were simply not intended for perpetual existence. This discussion is found in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics:
The same thing is true of those substances which Empedocles said were produced at the beginning of the world, such as the ‘ox-progeny’, i.e., half ox and half man. For if such things were not able to arrive at some end and final state of nature so that they would be preserved in existence, this was not because nature did not intend this [a final state], but because they were not capable of being preserved. For they were not generated according to nature, but by the corruption of some natural principle, as it now also happens that some monstrous offspring are generated because of the corruption of seed.[86]

[edit] Just war

Augustine of Hippo agreed strongly with the conventional wisdom of the time, that Christians should be pacifists, philosophically, but that they should use defense as a means of preserving peace in the long run, for example he routinely argued that this did not apply to the defence of innocents. In essence, the pursuit of peace must include the option of fighting to preserve it in the long-term.[87] Such a war could not be preemptive, but defensive, to restore peace.[88]
Thomas Aquinas, centuries later, used the authority of Augustine's arguments in an attempt to define the conditions under which a war could be just.[89] He laid these out in his historic work, Summa Theologica:
  • First, war must occur for a good and just purpose rather than for self-gain or as an exercise of power.
  • Second, just war must be waged by a properly instituted authority such as the state.
  • Third, peace must be a central motive even in the midst of violence.[90]

[edit] The School of Salamanca

Growing from Aquinas arguments was the School of Salamanca, which expanded on Thomistic understanding of natural law and just war. Given that war is one of the worst evils suffered by mankind, the adherents of the School reasoned that it ought to be resorted to only when it was necessary in order to prevent an even greater evil. A diplomatic agreement is preferable, even for the more powerful party, before a war is started. Examples of "just war" are:[citation needed]
  • In self-defense, as long as there is a reasonable possibility of success. If failure is a foregone conclusion, then it is just a wasteful spilling of blood.
  • Preventive war against a tyrant who is about to attack.
  • War to punish a guilty enemy.
A war is not legitimate or illegitimate simply based on its original motivation: it must comply with a series of additional requirements:[citation needed]
  • It is necessary that the response be commensurate to the evil; use of more violence than is strictly necessary would constitute an unjust war.
  • Governing authorities declare war, but their decision is not sufficient cause to begin a war. If the people oppose a war, then it is illegitimate. The people have a right to depose a government that is waging, or is about to wage, an unjust war.
  • Once war has begun, there remain moral limits to action. For example, one may not attack innocents or kill hostages.
  • It is obligatory to take advantage of all options for dialogue and negotiations before undertaking a war; war is only legitimate as a last resort.
Under this doctrine, expansionist wars, wars of pillage, wars to convert infidels or pagans, and wars for glory are all inherently unjust.

[edit] Nature of God

Thomas believed that the existence of God is self-evident in itself, but not to us. "Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject.... Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature — namely, by effects."[91]
Thomas believed that the existence of God can be proven. In the Summa theologiae, he considered in great detail five reasons for the existence of God. These are widely known as the quinque viae, or the "Five Ways."
The Five Ways Aquinas Tried to Prove God's Existence
  1. Motion: Some things are undoubtedly undergoing motion, though cannot cause their own motion. Since Thomas believed there can be no infinite chain of causes of motion, this leads to the conclusion there must be a first cause of motion that is not itself moved by anything else, and this is what everyone understands by God.
  2. Causation: Like motion, nothing can cause itself, and like motion there must be a First Cause, called God
  3. Existence of necessary and the unnecessary: Our experience includes things certainly existing but apparently unnecessary. Not everything can be unnecessary, for then once there was nothing and there would still be nothing. Therefore, we are compelled to suppose something that exists necessarily, having this necessity only from itself; in fact itself the cause why other things exist.
  4. Gradation: If we can notice a gradation in things in the sense that some things are more hot, good, etc., there must be a superlative which is the truest and noblest thing, and so most fully existing. This then, we call God -->note Thomas does not ascribe actual qualities to God Himself!
  5. Ordered tendencies of nature: A direction of actions to an end is noticed in all bodies following natural laws. Anything without awareness tends to a goal under the guidance of one who is aware. This we call God --> Note that even when we guide objects, in Thomas' view the source of all our knowledge comes from God as well.[92]
Concerning the nature of God, Thomas felt the best approach, commonly called the via negativa, is to consider what God is not. This led him to propose five statements about the divine qualities:
  1. God is simple, without composition of parts, such as body and soul, or matter and form.[93]
  2. God is perfect, lacking nothing. That is, God is distinguished from other beings on account of God's complete actuality.[94] Thomas defined God as the ‘Ipse Actus Essendi subsistens,’ subsisting act of being.[95]
  3. God is infinite. That is, God is not finite in the ways that created beings are physically, intellectually, and emotionally limited. This infinity is to be distinguished from infinity of size and infinity of number.[96]
  4. God is immutable, incapable of change on the levels of God's essence and character.[97]
  5. God is one, without diversification within God's self. The unity of God is such that God's essence is the same as God's existence. In Thomas's words, "in itself the proposition 'God exists' is necessarily true, for in it subject and predicate are the same."[98]
In this approach, he is following, among others, the Jewish philosopher Maimonides.[99]
Following St. Augustine of Hippo, Thomas defines sin as "a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law."[100] It is important to note the analogous nature of law in Thomas's legal philosophy. Natural law is an instance or instantiation of eternal law. Because natural law is that which human beings determine according to their own nature (as rational beings), disobeying reason is disobeying natural law and eternal law. Thus eternal law is logically prior to reception of either "natural law" (that determined by reason) or "divine law" (that found in the Old and New Testaments). In other words, God's will extends to both reason and revelation. Sin is abrogating either one's own reason, on the one hand, or revelation on the other, and is synonymous with "evil" (privation of good, or privatio boni[101]). Thomas, like all Scholastics, generally argued that the findings of reason and data of revelation cannot conflict, so both are a guide to God's will for human beings.

[edit] Nature of the Trinity

Thomas argued that God, while perfectly united, also is perfectly described by Three Interrelated Persons. These three persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) are constituted by their relations within the essence of God. Thomas wrote that the term "Trinity" "does not mean the relations themselves of the Persons, but rather the number of persons related to each other; and hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to another."[102] The Father generates the Son (or the Word) by the relation of self-awareness. This eternal generation then produces an eternal Spirit "who enjoys the divine nature as the Love of God, the Love of the Father for the Word."
This Trinity exists independently from the world. It transcends the created world, but the Trinity also decided to give grace to human beings. This takes place through the Incarnation of the Word in the person of Jesus Christ and through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit within those who have experienced salvation by God; according to Aidan Nichols.[103]

[edit] Prima causa – first cause

Thomas's five proofs for the existence of God take some of Aristotle's assertions concerning principles of being. For Thomas, God as prima causa (first cause) comes from Aristotle's concept of the unmoved mover and asserts that God is the ultimate cause of all things.[104]

[edit] Nature of Jesus Christ

In the Summa Theologica, Thomas begins his discussion of Jesus Christ by recounting the biblical story of Adam and Eve and by describing the negative effects of original sin. The purpose of Christ's Incarnation was to restore human nature by removing "the contamination of sin", which humans cannot do by themselves. "Divine Wisdom judged it fitting that God should become man, so that thus one and the same person would be able both to restore man and to offer satisfaction."[105] Thomas argued in favor of the satisfaction view of atonement; that is, that Jesus Christ died "to satisfy for the whole human race, which was sentenced to die on account of sin."[106]
Thomas argued against several specific contemporary and historical theologians who held differing views about Christ. In response to Photinus, Thomas stated that Jesus was truly divine and not simply a human being. Against Nestorius, who suggested that Son of God was merely conjoined to the man Christ, Thomas argued that the fullness of God was an integral part of Christ's existence. However, countering Apollinaris' views, Thomas held that Christ had a truly human (rational) soul, as well. This produced a duality of natures in Christ. Thomas argued against Eutyches that this duality persisted after the Incarnation. Thomas stated that these two natures existed simultaneously yet distinguishably in one real human body, unlike the teachings of Manichaeus and Valentinus.[107]
In short, "Christ had a real body of the same nature of ours, a true rational soul, and, together with these, perfect Deity." Thus, there is both unity (in his one hypostasis) and composition (in his two natures, human and Divine) in Christ.[108]
I answer that, The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even as the Nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, insomuch as one being subsists in two.[109]
Echoing Athanasius of Alexandria, he said that "The only begotten Son of God...assumed our nature, so that he, made man, might make men gods."[110]

[edit] Goal of human life

In Thomas's thought, the goal of human existence is union and eternal fellowship with God. Specifically, this goal is achieved through the beatific vision, an event in which a person experiences perfect, unending happiness by seeing the very essence of God. This vision, which occurs after death, is a gift from God given to those who have experienced salvation and redemption through Christ while living on earth.
This ultimate goal carries implications for one's present life on earth. Thomas stated that an individual's will must be ordered toward right things, such as charity, peace, and holiness. He sees this as the way to happiness. Thomas orders his treatment of the moral life around the idea of happiness. The relationship between will and goal is antecedent in nature "because rectitude of the will consists in being duly ordered to the last end [that is, the beatific vision]." Those who truly seek to understand and see God will necessarily love what God loves. Such love requires morality and bears fruit in everyday human choices.[111]

[edit] Treatment of heretics

Thomas Aquinas belonged to the Dominican Order (formally Ordo Praedicatorum, the Order of Preachers) who began as an order dedicated to the conversion of the Albigensians and other heterodox factions, at first by peaceful means; later the Albigensians were dealt with by means of the Albigensian Crusade. In the Summa theologiae, he wrote:
With regard to heretics two points must be observed: one, on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On their own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death. On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but "after the first and second admonition," as the Apostle directs: after that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for his conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating him and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him to the secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by death.(Summa, II–II, Q.11, art.3.)
Heresy was a capital offense against the secular law of most European countries of the 13th century, which had a limited prison capacity. Simple theft, forgery, fraud, and other such crimes were also capital offenses; Thomas' point seems to be that the gravity of this offense, which touches not only the material goods but also the spiritual goods of others, is at least the same as forgery. Thomas's suggestion specifically demands that heretics be handed to a "secular tribunal" rather than magisterial authority. That Thomas specifically says that heretics "deserve... death" is related to his theology, according to which all sinners have no intrinsic right to life ("For the wages of sin is death; but the free gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord"[112]). Nevertheless, his point is clear: heretics should be executed by the state. He elaborates on his opinion regarding heresy in the next article, when he says:
In God's tribunal, those who return are always received, because God is a searcher of hearts, and knows those who return in sincerity. But the Church cannot imitate God in this, for she presumes that those who relapse after being once received, are not sincere in their return; hence she does not debar them from the way of salvation, but neither does she protect them from the sentence of death. (Summa, op. cit., art.4.)

[edit] The afterlife and resurrection

A grasp of Aquinas's psychology is essential for understanding his beliefs around the afterlife and resurrection. Thomas, following Church doctrine, accepts that the soul continues to exist after the death of the body. Because he accepts that the soul is the form of the body, then he also must believe that the human being, like all material things, is form-matter composite. Substantial form (the human soul) configures prime matter (the physical body) and is the form by which a material composite belongs to that species it does; in the case of human beings, that species is rational animal.[113] So, a human being is a matter-form composite that is organized to be a rational animal. Matter cannot exist without being configured by form, but form can exist without matter—which allows for the separation of soul from body. Aquinas says that the soul shares in the material and spiritual worlds, and so has some features of matter and other, immaterial, features (such as access to universals). The human soul is different from other material and spiritual things; it is created by God, but also only comes into existence in the material body.
Human beings are material, but the human person can survive the death of the body through continued existence of the soul, which persists. The human soul straddles the spiritual and material worlds, and is both a configured subsistent form as well as a configurer of matter into that of a living, bodily human.[114] Because it is spiritual, the human soul does not depend on matter and may exist separately. Because the human being is a soul-matter composite, the body has a part in what it is to be human. Perfected human nature consists in the human dual nature, embodied and intellecting.
Resurrection appears to require dualism, which Thomas rejects. Yet, Aquinas believes the soul persists after the death and corruption of the body, and is capable of existence, separated from the body between the time of death and the resurrection. Aquinas believes in a different sort of dualism, one guided by Christian scripture. Aquinas knows that human beings are essentially physical, but that that physicality has a spirit capable of returning to God after life.[115] For Aquinas, the rewards and punishment of the afterlife are not only spiritual. Because of this, resurrection is an important part of his philosophy on the soul. The human is fulfilled and complete in the body, so the hereafter must take place with souls enmattered in resurrected bodies. In addition to spiritual reward, humans can expect to enjoy material and physical blessings. Because Aquinas’s soul requires a body for its actions, during the afterlife, the soul will also be punished or rewarded in corporeal existence.
Aquinas states clearly his stance on resurrection, and uses it to back up his philosophy of justice; that is, the promise of resurrection compensates Christians who suffered in this world through a heavenly union with the divine. He says, “If there is no resurrection of the dead, it follows that there is no good for human beings other than in this life.”[116] Resurrection provides the impetus for people on earth to give up pleasures in this life. Thomas believes the human who has prepared for the afterlife both morally and intellectually will be rewarded more greatly; however, all reward is through the grace of God. Aquinas insists beatitude will be conferred according to merit, and will render the person better able to conceive the divine. Aquinas accordingly believes punishment is directly related to earthly, living preparation and activity as well. Aquinas’s account of the soul focuses on epistemology and metaphysics, and because of this he believes it gives a clear account of the immaterial nature of the soul. Aquinas conservatively guards Christian doctrine, and thus maintains physical and spiritual reward and punishment after death. By accepting the essentiality of both body and soul, he allows for a heaven and hell described in scripture and church dogma.

[edit] Modern influence

Many modern ethicists both within and outside the Catholic Church (notably Philippa Foot and Alasdair MacIntyre) have recently commented on the possible use of Thomas's virtue ethics as a way of avoiding utilitarianism or Kantian "sense of duty" (called deontology). Through the work of twentieth century philosophers such as Elizabeth Anscombe (especially in her book Intention), Thomas's principle of double effect specifically and his theory of intentional activity generally have been influential.
In recent years, the cognitive neuroscientist Walter Freeman proposes that Thomism is the philosophical system explaining cognition that is most compatible with neurodynamics, in a 2008 article in the journal Mind and Matter entitled "Nonlinear Brain Dynamics and Intention According to Aquinas."
Thomas's aesthetic theories, especially the concept of claritas, deeply influenced the literary practice of modernist writer James Joyce, who used to extol Thomas as being second only to Aristotle among Western philosophers. The influence of Thomas's aesthetics also can be found in the works of the Italian semiotician Umberto Eco, who wrote an essay on aesthetic ideas in Thomas (published in 1956 and republished in 1988 in a revised edition).

[edit] Criticism

Bertrand Russell criticized Aquinas' philosophy on the ground that
He does not, like the Platonic Socrates, set out to follow wherever the argument may lead. He is not engaged in an inquiry, the result of which it is impossible to know in advance. Before he begins to philosophize, he already knows the truth; it is declared in the Catholic faith. If he can find apparently rational arguments for some parts of the faith, so much the better; if he cannot, he need only fall back on revelation. The finding of arguments for a conclusion given in advance is not philosophy, but special pleading. I cannot, therefore, feel that he deserves to be put on a level with the best philosophers either of Greece or of modern times.[117]
This critique is illustrated on the following examples: According to Russell, Aquinas advocates the indissolubility of marriage "on the ground that the father is useful in the education of the children, (a) because he is more rational than the mother, (b) because, being stronger, he is better able to inflict physical punishment."[118] Even though modern approaches to education do not support these views, "no follower of Saint Thomas would, on that account, cease to believe in lifelong monogamy, because the real grounds of belief are not those which are alleged."[118] It may be countered that the treatment of matrimony in the Summa Theologica is in the Supplements volume, which was not written by Aquinas.[119] Moreover, as noted above,[120] Aquinas's introduction of arguments and concepts from the pagan Aristotle and Muslim Averroes was not uncontroversial within the Catholic church.
Aquinas' views of God as first cause, cf. quinque viae, "depend upon the supposed impossibility of a series having no first term. Every mathematician knows that there is no such impossibility; the series of negative integers ending with minus one is an instance to the contrary."[118] Moreover, according to Russell, statements regarding God's essence and existence that are reached within the Aristotelian logic are based on "some kind of syntactical confusion, without which much of the argumentation about God would lose its plausibility."[118]
According to Russell, the methodology of scholasticism used by Thomas is employed for proving what is already believed to be true. Therefore, according to Russell his work should be viewed perhaps as an artful, concise argument, but not a decisive proof. To the contrary, concerning Russell's criticism of Aquinas Anthony Kenny (Aquinas on Mind, 1993, 11) makes the following observation: "It is extraordinary that that accusation should be made by Russell, who in the book Principia Mathematica takes hundreds of pages to prove that two and two make four, which is something he had believed all his life."

[edit] Claims of levitation

For centuries, there have been recurring claims that Thomas had the ability to levitate. For example, G. K. Chesterton wrote that, "His experiences included well-attested cases of levitation in ecstasy; and the Blessed Virgin appeared to him, comforting him with the welcome news that he would never be a Bishop."[121]

[edit] See also

[edit] Sources

[edit] Footnotes

  1. ^ a b Gilby, Thomas (1951). St. Thomas Aquinas Philosophical Texts. Oxford Univ. Press.
  2. ^ Fr. Conway, John Placid (1911). Saint Thomas Aquinas. London.
  3. ^ Rev. Vaughan, Roger Bede (1871). The Life and Labours of St. Thomas of Aquin: Vol.I. London.
  4. ^ Spiazzi, Raimondo (1995). San Tommaso d'Aquino: biografia documentata. Bologna.
  5. ^ See Pius XI, Studiorum Ducem 11 (29 June 1923), AAS, XV ("non modo Angelicum, sed etiam Communem seu Universalem Ecclesiae Doctorem"). The title Doctor Communis dates to the fourteenth century; the title Doctor Angelicus dates to the fifteenth century, see Walz, Xenia Thomistica, III, p. 164 n. 4. Tolomeo da Lucca writes in Historia Ecclesiastica (1317): “This man is supreme among modern teachers of philosophy and theology, and indeed in every subject. And such is the common view and opinion, so that nowadays in the University of Paris they call him the Doctor Communis because of the outstanding clarity of his teaching.” Historia Eccles. xxiii, c. 9.
  6. ^ Code of Canon Law, Can. 252, §3 [1]
  7. ^ Benedict XV Encyclical Fausto appetente die 29 June 1921, AAS 13 (1921), 332; Pius XI Encyclical Studiorum Ducem §11, 29 June 1923, AAS 15 (1923), cf. AAS 17 (1925) 574; Paul VI, 7 March 1964 AAS 56 (1964), 302 (Bouscaren, vol. VI, pp. 786–88).
  8. ^ Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person And His Work, CUA press, 2005, p. 3. Google Book
  9. ^ Hampden, The Life, p. 14.
  10. ^ a b c d Stump, Aquinas, p. 3.
  11. ^ a b Schaff, Philip (1953). "Thomas Aquinas". The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge. 126. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House. pp. 422–423. Bibcode 1930Natur.126..951G. doi:10.1038/126951c0.
  12. ^ Davies, Aquinas: An Introduction, pp. 1–2
  13. ^ a b c Davies, Aquinas: An Introduction, p. 2
  14. ^ Hampden, The Life, pp. 21–22.
  15. ^ Grabmann, Martin. Virgil Michel, trans. Thomas Aquinas: His Personality and Thought. (Kessinger Publishing, 2006), pp. 2.
  16. ^ Collison, Diane, and Kathryn Plant. Fifty Major Philosophers. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2006.
  17. ^ a b Hampden, The Life, p. 23.
  18. ^ Hampden, The Life, p. 24.
  19. ^ Hampden, The Life, p. 25.
  20. ^ Hampden, The Life, pp. 27–28.
  21. ^ a b Healy, Theologian, p. 2.
  22. ^ Hampden, The Life, p. 33.
  23. ^ Stump, Aquinas, p. xvi.
  24. ^ Davies, The Thought, p. 5.
  25. ^ Aquinas, Thomas; Richard J. Regan, Brian Davies (2003). On Evil. Oxford University Press US. p. 5. ISBN 0-19-509183-3.
  26. ^ a b Stump, Aquinas, p. 4.
  27. ^ Davies, Aquinas: An Introduction, pp. 3–4.
  28. ^ a b Stump, Aquinas, p. xvii.
  29. ^ a b Davies, Aquinas: An Introduction, p. 4.
  30. ^ http://saints.sqpn.com/saint-thomas-aquinas/
  31. ^ a b Healy, Theologian, p. 4.
  32. ^ Fr. Thome de Aquino iniungimus in remissionem peccatorum quod teneat studium Rome, et volumus quod fratribus qui stant secum ad studendum provideatur in necessariis vestimentis a conventibus de quorum predicatione traxerunt originem. Si autem illi studentes inventi fuerint negligentes in studio, damus potestatem fr. Thome quod ad conventus suos possit eos remittere (Acta Capitulorum Provincialium, Provinciae Romanae Ordinis Praedicatorum, 1265, n. 12)http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/a65.html
  33. ^ Compendium Historiae Ordinis Praedicatorum, A.M. Walz, Herder 1930, 214: "Conventus S. Sabinae de Urbe prae ceteris gloriam singularem ex praesentia fundatoris ordinis et primitivorum fratrum necnon ex residentia Romana magistrorum generalium, si de ea sermo esse potest, habet. In documentis quidem eius nonnisi anno 1222 nomen fit, ait certe iam antea nostris concreditus est. Florebant ibi etiam studia sacra." http://www.archive.org/stream/MN5081ucmf_3/MN5081ucmf_3_djvu.txt Accessed 4-9-2011."
  34. ^ Marian Michèle Mulchahey, "First the bow is bent in study": Dominican education before 1350, 1998, p. 278-279. http://books.google.com/books?id=bK9axCYcbFIC&pg=PA279#v=onepage&q&f=false Accessed 6-30-2011
  35. ^ "Tenuit studium Rome, quasi totam Philosophiam, sive Moralem, sive Naturalem exposuit." Ptolomaei Lucensis historia ecclesiastica nova, xxii, c. 24, in In Gregorovius' History of the City of Rome In the Middle Ages, Vol V, part II, 617, note 2. http://www.third-millennium-library.com/PDF/Authors/Gregorovius/history-of-rome-city_5_2.pdf Accessed 6-5-2011.
  36. ^ Summa theologiae, I, 1, prooemium:"Quia Catholicae veritatis doctor non solum provectos debet instruere, sed ad eum pertinet etiam incipientes erudire, secundum illud apostoli I ad Corinth. III, tanquam parvulis in Christo, lac vobis potum dedi, non escam; propositum nostrae intentionis in hoc opere est, ea quae ad Christianam religionem pertinent, eo modo tradere, secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientium."
  37. ^ a b c d Davies, Aquinas: An Introduction, p. 5.
  38. ^ http://aquinatis.blogspot.com/2008/05/vida-de-santo-toms-de-aquino.html Accessed June 22, 2011: "A mediados de noviembre abandonó Santo Tomás la ciudad de Viterbo en compañía de fray Reginaldo de Piperno y su discípulo fray Nicolás Brunacci." http://www.brunacci.it/s--tommaso.html Accessed June 22, 2011. http://www.brunacci.it/s--tommaso.html Accessed June 22, 2011: "Per l'acutezza del suo ingegno, dopo aver studiato nella sua provincia, ebbe l'alto onore di accompagnare S. Tommaso a Parigi nel novembre del 1268. Rimase in quello studio fino al 1272 e di là passò a Colonia sotto la disciplina di Alberto Magno."
  39. ^ http://www.santiebeati.it/dettaglio/92060 Accessed June 29, 2011
  40. ^ Compendium Historiae Ordinis Praedicatorum, A.M. Walz, Herder 1930, 214: Romanus conventus S. Mariae supra Minervam anno 1255 ex conditionibus parvis crevit. Tunc enim paenitentibus feminis in communi regulariter ibi 1252/53 viventibus ad S. Pancratium migratis fratres Praedicatores domum illam relictam a Summo Pontifice habendam petierunt et impetranint. Qua demum feliciter obtenda capellam hospitio circa annum 1255 adiecerunt. Huc evangelizandi causa fratres e conventu S. Sabinae descendebant. http://www.archive.org/stream/MN5081ucmf_3/MN5081ucmf_3_djvu.txt Accessed 5-17-2011
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  118. ^ a b c d (Russell 1967, p. 462)
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  121. ^ G. K. Chesterton wrote an Essay on St. Thomas Aquinas which appeared in The Spectator 27 Feb. 1932.

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[edit] Further reading

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[edit] On his thought

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